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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Security has become a crucial concern in hardware design due to the growing need of protection in everyday 
financial transactions and exchanges of private information. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) utilize 
the inevitable process variations and other stochastic properties in devices to provide a unique way to verify 
trusted users during access to hardware devices. Improvements in attack methods have recently moved the 
field of PUFs from traditional silicon devices toward emerging non-volatile memories, such as phase 
change memory (PCM). Due to intrinsic cell-to-cell and cycle-to-cycle programming variability and high 
endurance properties of PCM nano-devices, unpredictable and reconfigurable PUF challenge-response 
pairs can be achieved. This programming variability, which comes in addition to the process variations 
present in any technology, is an important advantage of PCM for implementations of PUFs and other 
hardware security primitives. 
In this work, programming variability in PCM nano-devices are electrically characterized using 
various cell dimensions and pulsing techniques for PUF applications. The underlying contributing factors, 
originating from external circuitry and phase change dynamics of PCM nano-devices, that enhance 
programming variability are identified by performing post-measurement scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) imaging, further electrical characterization, SPICE modeling of the experimental setup, and finite 
element simulations of PCM devices.  
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Once programmed, the short and long-term stability of the programmed states in PCM nano-
devices is monitored, and the spontaneous resistance evolution trends for different cell types are studied, 
which helped in identifying the cell geometries that result in long data retention time for memory devices, 
and those that result in earlier data loss creating opportunities for new security applications, such as time-
sensitive memory devices. The disturbance to the spontaneous resistance evolution at any programmed state 
caused by SEM imaging is also characterized. Imaging is observed to leave remarkable evidence of 
tampering posing resistance toward reverse engineering and ensuring robust security to the PCM-based 
nano-devices. Lastly, the reconfigurable source of randomness in PCM-based PUFs relying on 
programming variability is contrasted with a static source of randomness in a ZnO nanoforest-based PUF. 
The advantageous reconfigurability in PCM-based PUFs can ensure resistance toward physical attacks, 
which is not achieved with the ZnO nanoforest-based PUF. 
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Chapter 1 | Background Studies 
1.1 Introduction and Conventional Security Solutions 
Security is an inherent need for human life. The security requirements in the current age, however, 
have broadened beyond the necessity of protecting tangible property. In the modern world of 
internet of things (IoT), countless physical devices, vehicles, home appliances, medical wearables, 
factories, smart cities, and many other systems are intricately being connected through sensors and 
software and are exchanging data that must be secured [1]. CISCO has predicted an exponential 
increase of the number of connected devices with an estimated 6.58 devices per person on average, 
worldwide by 2020 [2]. Hence, any breach of security can lead to significant issues in the lives of 
large number of individuals by leak of health-related, financial, and private information and can 
cause severe economic loss and exposure of confidentiality [3]. Therefore, comprehensive 
measures need to be taken to secure not only the cyber space but also the myriads of connected 
devices. In this chapter, conventional and novel methods of securing hardware devices are 
discussed, and contributions of this dissertation to the hardware security field is introduced. 
In a security system, a securely stored secret key is used along with cryptographic 
algorithms. The leak of a secret key means that the security of the system has been broken [3]. The 
traditional mechanisms to store keys in devices included permanent writing of the secret 
information to a battery-backed static random access memory (SRAM) array or on a read only 
memory (ROM), and using cryptographic operations, such as digital signature or encryption [4]. 
The battery-backed SRAM is expensive in terms of area and power requirement due to the volatile 
nature of the memory operation [4] and suffers from limited reliability due to the possibility of 
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battery failure. Among the non-volatile key storage solutions, the most common one is the ROM-
based, in which masks generate the permanent keys during the manufacturing stage and these are 
not erasable or modifiable in the post-manufacturing phase [3]. This technique requires new masks 
for each new key and thus prolongs the production time. The major disadvantage of this scheme, 
however, is that the secret key is always available in the permanent non-volatile ROM, even when 
the device is powered off, allowing opportunities for invasive or physical attacks. Recent advances 
in physical attack techniques on electronic chips via fault analysis tools have made it easier to 
produce fake security chips, which can serve as clones and continue to communicate in the IoT 
environment. The most commonly used tools for invasive attacks are high resolution imaging with 
optical microscopy or scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and using destructive measures such 
as a focused ion beam (FIB) or a laser cutter to reverse engineer precisely, layer-by-layer. In 
microprobing attacks, electrical measurements can reveal the permanent secret key stored in the 
permanent memory [3].  
Other non-volatile key storage solutions have been proposed using floating gate 
technologies (flash memory) but their complex fabrication makes it impractical for PUF 
application and these are still vulnerable to leak or manipulation of secret key through 
microprobing attacks [3]. Incorporation of powered tamper-sensing and tamper-proof circuits are 
required to detect or prevent invasive attacks, respectively, at the cost of additional area and power 
[4].  
The radio frequency identifier (RFID) tag is one of the commonly used products that stores 
secret data permanently. The RFID tag also includes an antenna and communicates with a reader. 
The reader has its own antenna, it interrogates an RFID tag with a challenge data signal and 
provides the required energy for the tag to operate. The RFID tag transmits back a response signal 
3 
 
incorporating the secret information permanently stored in the memory. The reader later 
communicates with the host computer for further processing of the communication and secret 
information (Figure 1-1). The information is hard-programmed into the RFID memory chip during 
manufacturing stages and cannot be erased or modified later. Physical attacks reveal the secret 
information and give an adversary the opportunity to produce clone chips. In addition, the RFID 
tag is also subject to leak information via eavesdropping, by which an unauthorized reader listens 
to the communication between the legitimate tag and reader to steal information or gain access. 
The attacker can also record one part of the communication and conduct a replay attack to the 
receiving device at a later time [5]. By observing the pattern of power consumption variations 
during the correct and the incorrect passcodes, the attacker can conduct a power analysis attack, 
which is a side-channel attack to retrieve secret information. The attacker can also pursue a man-
in-the-middle attack by blocking or manipulating the signal communication path or carry out a 
denial-of-service attack by injecting noise and interference into the network, in order to take the 
system down [5]. Hence, secret keys should ideally be written with unclonable schemes and in 
sufficiently large numbers to avoid physical attacks.  
 
Figure 1-1: Basic working principle of traditional passive radio frequency identification (RFID) 
system [5].  
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1.2 Hardware Security with PUFs 
1.2.1 PUF Introduction 
Considering the above-mentioned threats, intrinsic random physical properties of circuits or 
devices have been employed, in recent years, to create a distinguishable and unclonable security 
primitive. The idea is very similar to the presence of distinct biometrics in individuals (such as, 
fingerprints, voice pattern, iris or facial features). The concept was initially introduced as physical 
one-way functions (POWF) and physical random functions, and eventually termed as physical 
unclonable functions (PUFs). A PUF is queried with a certain input (challenge) and a measurable 
output (response) is generated based on the innate unique physical properties of the devices or 
circuits that make the PUF system. A PUF can have one or several challenge(s) and response(s), 
which are called the challenge-response pair(s) or CRP(s) (Figure 1-2a). The relation between the 
challenges and responses or the CRP behavior should not be easily realizable with mathematical 
functions and true physical randomness may ensure this. Hence, a PUF is not a mere mathematical 
function but rather a procedure with input-output functionality. Moreover, a PUF is not just an 
abstract concept but rather has to be always implemented in a physical entity [6]. PUF CRPs can 
be either analog or digital bit strings. For analog CRPs, several stages of decoding and quantization 
are required to generate the digital bit string CRPs. A PUF system should be easy and economical 
to implement yet very hard to clone. A PUF should also be easily measurable within reasonable 
time, effort, power, or area [6].  
5 
 
1.2.2 PUF Security Metrics 
There are several essential features that describe the behavior of a PUF, each described briefly 
below (Figure 1-2b-g):  
 
Figure 1-2: (a) Basic working principle of the physical unclonable function (PUF). (b-g) Schematic 
representations of essential features of PUF. Schematics redrawn from [7]. 
i. Reliability or reproducibility:  
The responses generated from the same PUF inquired by the same challenge should always 
be very similar during multiple observations (Figure 1-2b). This feature guarantees reproducibility 
of responses, and a dissimilarity in the responses generated from the same challenges is called 
noise. Reproducibility is a distinct feature of PUF, which makes it different than a true random 
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number generator (TRNG) [6]. For digital bit string responses, the noise is measured with a 
hamming distance which is summarized with histograms. A gaussian distribution is often used as 
an approximation and the mean (µintra) or the standard deviation (σintra) is calculated to portray the 
amount of noise in terms of intra-hamming distance. For reliable PUF responses, µintra is expected 
to be as small as possible (ideally ~0%). Minimal noise is expected even for a large range of 
variations in environmental factors, such as external temperature, supply voltage, light exposure, 
or the effect of aging. Since the environmental effects are systematic, a differential approach is 
utilized to nullify the disturbances experienced by all PUFs in case of a linear impact. The 
responses generated by two PUFs can either be divided or subtracted to ignore the deviations in 
responses due to common environmental contributions. This technique is called compensation [6] 
and is one of the measures taken for error correction. A PUF may use multiple error correction 
techniques and some of these are vulnerable to leakage of secret information [4].  
ii. Uniqueness:  
The responses generated from different PUFs inquired by the same challenge should be 
distinguishably different (Figure 1-2c). The span of the dissimilarity of the responses in this case 
is mathematically expressed by the inter-hamming distance in terms of the mean (µinter) or the 
standard deviation (σinter). For unique PUFs, µinter is expected to be close to ~50%, implying a 
random and equal probability of the occurrence of either state in a two bit system [6].  
iii. Unclonable:  
The PUF system should be impossible to clone by an adversary even if he has complete 
knowledge of a legitimate PUF instance (Figure 1-2d). The impossibility of cloning the system 
can arise from uncontrolled manufacturing variations and/or other physical properties manifested 
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at the micro- and nano-scales within the devices [7]. Unclonability is the core feature of a PUF. 
This property includes two aspects – mathematical unclonability and physical unclonability. A 
PUF system is mathematically unclonable if it cannot be formulated in mathematical models and 
it is physically unclonable if it cannot be reproduced due to manufacturing variations or the 
inherent physics of device operation. A PUF system should satisfy both unclonability aspects to 
be truly unclonable [6].  
iv. One-way:  
Since, the PUF functionality should not be realizable with simple mathematical 
expressions, it should be impossible to invert the PUF behavior mathematically or to estimate an 
unknown challenge only by observing a given response (Figure 1-2e) [7].  
v. Unpredictable:  
Due to the infeasibility of modeling a PUF system, the knowledge of a given challenge 
should not release the expected response either (Figure 1-2f) [7]. A PUF system fails to satisfy this 
requirement if an adversary, with access to the full PUF, can predict the upcoming responses for 
given challenges based on the knowledge he gained during observations of a set of previous CRPs. 
In this case, the adversary would have succeeded to model the PUF system and the cloning would 
have broken the unpredictable feature of the PUF [6].  
vi. Tamper-evident:  
A physical attack on the PUF system should permanently change its functionality or leave 
indelible evidence in the device so that further measurements on the device clearly indicate 
tampering (Figure 1-2g) [7].  
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1.2.3 PUF Classification 
Based on the construction and operation principle, PUFs can be divided into the two broad 
categories of non-electronic and electronic PUFs (Figure 1-3).  
 
Figure 1-3: PUFs classified in terms of construction and working principle [6].  
1.2.3.1 Non-electronic PUFs  
The non-electronic PUFs rely on the physical variability of any non-electronic stochastic system, 
such as optical, magnetic, or acoustic. Digital techniques are eventually used to process the raw 
responses generated by a non-electronic PUF [6]. Among the non-electronic PUFs, the optical 
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PUF is the most common one, and optical PUF-like systems were already used in late 80s for 
unique identification. Unique optical reflection patterns from sprayed layers with randomly spaced 
light-reflecting particles were used for unclonable identification of weapons [8]. At the beginning 
of last decade, the unique interference pattern created by randomly spaced light-scattering particles 
was employed for an optical POWF, which also introduced the concept of PUF for the first time 
[9]. The optical token used in this system was made with a transparent epoxy plate (10×10×2.5 
mm) containing randomly placed refractive glass spheres (~500-800 µm diameter spheres with an 
average spacing of ~100 µm). The token was irradiated with a laser at a certain angle and the 
resulting speckle pattern generated at a screen was recorded by a CCD camera (Figure 1-4a). The 
challenge for this PUF system was the angle at which the laser was shone, and the raw response 
was the random speckle pattern. Due to the random spatial arrangement of the glass spheres inside 
the token, each laser angle resulted in a unique light scattering configuration, which in turn 
produced random dark and bright spots on the screen. These raw speckle pattern responses were 
then post-processed with a Gabor hash function to create a digital bit string output [9]. 
Despite detailed experimental validations and high security against modeling and physical 
cloning attacks of the optical PUF system, it has been later deemed impractical due to the 
cumbersome positioning of the optical system and the difficulty of miniaturizing the design into a 
compact chip with precise read-out mechanisms [10]. Designs for integration of such systems into 
a chip have later been proposed with the sequential arrangement of the light source array, the same 
disordered optical medium, and the sensor array [11] (Figure 1-4b,c).  
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Figure 1-4: (a) Optical physical one-way function (POWF) [9] and (b) later design proposals for 
integrated optical PUF. Schematics redrawn from [6] and [11]. 
Besides optical scattering from randomly distributed particles or shapes, other sources of 
randomness that have been proposed for non-electronic PUFs include (Figure 1-3):  
i. the unique and random fiber structure of paper for forgery prevention (scanned for 
measurement) [12], 
ii. the random measured lengths of lands and pits on a regular compact disk (CD) (measured 
by the electrical signal generated by photodiode inside the CD reader) [13],  
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iii. the random positioning of thin copper wire within a silicon rubber sealant, (the near-field 
scattering of electromagnetic waves (5-6 GHz band) was measured with an RF antenna 
array) [14],  
iv. the unique particle pattern in magnetic media of a swipe card [15],  
v. the characteristic frequency spectrum of an acoustic delay line that converts an alternating 
electrical signal into mechanical vibration and back [16]. 
1.2.3.2 Electronic PUFs  
 Analog Electronic PUFs 
The analog electronic PUFs are based on analog measurements of variability-prone 
electronic quantities originating from manufacturer variations and quantization processes are 
applied to the raw analog responses when digital bit string outputs are desired [6]. Some examples 
of such quantities from the literature include:  
i. the threshold voltage variation measured in identically designed transistors in an array [17],  
ii. the resistance variation in power grid of a chip [18],  
iii. capacitance variation in comb-shaped sensors in the top metal layer of an integrated circuit, 
where a passive dielectric spray containing random dielectric elements is explicitly 
introduced (this PUF is also named as coating PUF) [19],  
iv. the resonant frequency variation in identically designed LC circuits built by a glass plate 
sandwiched between two metal plates, along with a serially chained metal coil [20].  
 Digital Electronic PUFs 
Digital PUFs output digital bit(s) as responses. There are two major categories - the digital 
delay-based PUFs, which include arbiter PUFs and ring oscillator PUFs and the memory-based 
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PUFs, which are based on conventional CMOS memories or emerging non-volatile memories 
(NVM) (Figure 1-3).  
The arbiter PUF relies on the digital race condition between two symmetrically designed 
paths constructed with switch blocks. The switch blocks can be made of a pair of multiplexers and 
buffers with two inputs and two outputs in total. Based on a parameter input bit (0 or 1), the input 
and the output pairs are connected in either a straight or a switched fashion (Figure 1-5a). The 
challenge for the arbiter PUF is the sequence of parameter bits that are fed to the serially connected 
switch blocks. Due to manufacturer variations, there is always a slight difference between the two 
identically designed paths and thus one path becomes a little faster in propagating the signal. The 
random small difference between the two delays is received by an arbiter circuit, which decides 
which path wins the race by outputting a 0 or a 1 as the response. The arbiter circuit is made with 
a latch or a flip flop [21], [22] (Figure 1-5a). The differential nature of the response from the arbiter 
output cancels out the linear environmental factors, such as temperature, power supply voltage, or 
aging effects, that both delay lines equally experience [6]. If the delay difference between two 
paths is too small the arbiter circuit output will no longer depend on the race but rather will be 
determined by random noise, resulting in metastability of the arbiter and noisy PUF responses [6].  
By concatenating numerous switch blocks together, a large bit string is created as the 
challenge and hence an exponentially large number of CRPs (2n number of CRPs for n switch 
blocks) can be generated, despite the one-bit response [21], [22]. Due to the large number of CRPs, 
these PUFs are also categorized as strong PUFs and are used for authentication applications. After 
being used, each CRP is marked as ‘used’ in the server database so it cannot be reused, thus 
avoiding replay attacks [4]. 
13 
 
 
Figure 1-5: Delay-based CMOS PUFs: (a) arbiter PUF and (b, c) ring oscillator PUF with division 
and comparator compensation techniques. Schematics redrawn from [6]. 
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Due to the linear additive behavior of digital delays in the basic arbiter PUF, it is possible 
to model the entire arbiter PUF system mathematically using machine learning techniques, and 
accurate predictions can be made about unused CRPs after observing a certain number of CRPs. 
This is called model-building attack and it breaks the security of this PUF [23]. Subsequent works 
on arbiter PUFs were intended to make model-building attacks difficult. XOR-arbiter PUFs [24] 
and feed-forward arbiter PUFs [25] are two examples of such improvements based on introduction 
of nonlinearity to the delay lines. For the feed-forward arbiter PUF, several input challenge bits 
were received from the outcomes of some randomly placed intermediate arbiter circuits. However, 
these improved arbiter PUFs were shown to still be vulnerable to more advanced model-building 
attack techniques [25], [26].  
Ring oscillator (RO) PUFs also rely on delay deviations [23]. In an RO circuit, the output 
of a digital delay line is fed back to the input to create an asynchronous oscillating loop. Due to 
the manufacturer variations, the delay is random on different identically designed circuits, which 
in turn determines the resulting random frequency of the oscillation. The frequency is measured 
with an edge detector and a digital counter circuit connected at the output of the RO. A 
parameterizable delay setting is used as the challenge for this PUF and the measured frequency 
value at the counter output is used as the analog response for the basic RO PUF. However, as the 
resulting frequency greatly depends on temperature and power supply voltage, the PUF responses 
become noisier due to fluctuations in environmental factors. Therefore, compensation techniques 
are implemented by either dividing or subtracting the output frequency values from a pair of ring 
oscillator PUFs [23] (Figure 1-5b,c). The type of delay circuits used for RO PUFs is the same as 
of those used in arbiter PUFs circuit, and hence, similar model-building attacks are possible [21], 
[22]. Moreover, an unexpected high correlation exists between the responses generated from (1) 
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the same challenge inquired on different FPGAs and from (2) the different challenges inquired on 
the same FPGA [6]. In later works, only one out of 8 pairs of ROs used is selected to improve the 
uniqueness and reproducibility features of RO PUF. This technique is termed as 1-out-of-8 
masking [4]. 
PUFs based on conventional CMOS memory rely on the settling state of a destabilized 
digital memory circuit (Figure 1-6). A digital memory cell has two or more logical states, and, in 
normal operation, it can be programmed to one of these stable states and be used for information 
storage. However, if the memory cell is brought to an unstable state, it may start oscillating 
between the possible stable states and, after a certain time, converge to a preferred state, depending 
on the uncontrolled physical mismatch caused during manufacturing [6]. This concept has been 
used to implement PUFs with SRAM, latch, and flip flop circuits.  
The SRAM cell is made of two cross-coupled inverters consisting of four metal oxide 
semiconductor field effect transistors (MOSFETs) along with two additional access MOSFETs. 
Due to the inevitable manufacturer variations, both halves cannot be made exactly identical, and 
hence each SRAM cell has a slight inclination toward one of the two logical states (0 or 1) at 
power-up condition. For SRAM PUF, the powering up is the challenge, and the one bit settling 
state is the response, resulting in a single CRP per cell [27] (Figure 1-6a). Due to the limited 
number of CRPs and the linear relation between the CRP size and the number of components, 
these PUFs are also categorized as weak PUFs and are used for key generation applications [4].  
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Figure 1-6: Memory based CMOS PUFs: (a) SRAM PUF, (b) latch PUF, and (c) butterfly PUF. 
Schematics redrawn from [6]. 
Very similar concepts have also been applied as: 
i. latch PUF, where two cross-coupled NOR gates are brought to an unstable state by a reset 
signal (as the challenge) and the settling state is observed (as the response) [28] (Figure 
1-6b),  
ii. butterfly PUF, where two cross-coupled latches are brought to an unstable state by a 
clear/preset function (as the challenge) and the settling state is observed (as the response) 
[29] (Figure 1-6c),  
iii. flip-flop PUF, where power-up condition (challenge) results in a settling state (response) 
[30].  
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1.2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Different PUFs 
All the above-mentioned PUF technologies, along with the permanent key storage schemes, can 
generate unique identifiers or keys. The permanent key storage schemes, however, require hard-
programming during manufacturing to generate the keys and are vulnerable to physical cloning. 
For PUFs, in contrast, the uncontrollable process variations prevent manufacturing an exact 
physical copy [6].  
The delay-based PUFs (basic arbiter, feed forward arbiter, and the ring oscillator PUFs) 
are prone to model-building attacks and thus fail the unpredictability requirement of PUF. Even 
though the CRP size is exponentially large for the arbiter PUFs, the security is in peril when even 
a relatively small number of CRPs have been observed by the attacker. On the other hand, the 
CMOS memory based PUFs (SRAM, latch, and butterfly PUFs) can be read exhaustively and the 
entire CRP database will be known to the attacker. For these memory-based PUFs, the number of 
CRPs is linear with the number of cells in the array, and thus it is easier for an attacker to 
accomplish the knowledge of the entire CRP database [31]. The same problem also exists for the 
coating PUF and ring oscillator PUF with comparator compensation and 1-out-of-8 masking. 
Hence, mathematical cloning of all these CMOS-based PUFs can be made even though physical 
cloning of such technologies is impossible. Once manufactured, the physical mismatch that 
determines the preferred output state for a given challenge stays unchanged for the lifetime of these 
PUFs. Hence, there is no option to refresh the CRPs for these PUF technologies [6].  
To increase security against mathematical cloning, controlled PUFs (CPUFs) have been 
proposed, in which the PUF is complemented with cryptographic algorithms. In CPUF, the PUF 
is accessed only by the algorithm. A cryptographic hash function is used to generate randomly 
picked challenges so that model building attacks can be avoided (although this method cannot 
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thwart the model-building attack on arbiter PUF). The random challenges are used to interrogate 
the PUF and the generated responses are then fed to an error correction code (ECC) to improve 
the reliability or minimize noise. The output of the ECC is then inputted to another cryptographic 
hash function which breaks the link between the responses and the actual physical details of the 
PUF measurements [6], [23] (Figure 1-7a).  
 
Figure 1-7: Working principles of (a) controlled PUF [6], (b) logically reconfigurable PUF [32], 
and (c) physically reconfigurable PUF [32]. C, R, Rʹ stand for challenge, response, and 
reconfigured response, respectively. Cint and Rint refer to intermediate challenge and responses.  
Another way to increase security of the system has been accomplished by reconfigurable 
PUFs (RPUFs). In an RPUF, the partial or complete CRP can be refreshed irreversibly, and 
thereby a completely new PUF is created after every refresh. The RPUFs are categorized into two 
types – logically and physically reconfigurable PUFs (L-RPUFs and P-RPUFs). In L-RPUF, the 
responses are interfaced with a multiplexer, control logic, or control query algorithm for the 
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reconfiguration purpose (Figure 1-7b) [33]. In P-RPUF, in contrast, the responses are intrinsically 
altered due to the physical mechanism involved in refreshing the material properties, which is not 
only more efficient than L-RPUF in terms of area but also more secure against tampering because 
of the physical origin of stochasticity (Figure 1-7c) [32], [34]. 
1.3 Nanodevice-based PUFs 
CMOS based PUFs received significant attention and were the focus of rigorous research efforts 
for many years. However, the unaddressed challenges of overcoming mathematical clonability 
have recently shifted the focus in the PUF field toward novel nanotechnologies and nanomaterials. 
Moreover, CMOS technology is approaching its scaling limits and new technologies are emerging 
to continue to deliver performance improvements with smaller devices [35].  
For storage applications, various kinds of resistive switching memory technologies have 
been demonstrated with promising speed, endurance, retention time, scalability, and energy 
efficiency. The most progress has been made in the fields of phase change memory (PCM), 
resistive random access memory (RRAM), and spin-transfer torque magnetic random access 
memory (STT-MRAM) technologies. These nanodevices offer easy fabrication with simple cell 
structures (Figure 1-8) [36]. All these technologies incorporate compact two-terminal devices 
relying on resistive switching. These memory devices can be reversibly programmed to various 
resistance levels by suitable electrical pulses. The programmed states are easily distinguishable as 
distinct states and are stable under normal operating conditions (such as room temperature and 
supply voltage) assuring long data retention time.  
These novel memories can potentially produce light-weight, robust, secure, and 
reconfigurable PUFs and other security primitives to meet the next generation security challenges. 
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An intrinsic property of these nanodevices, variability, typically a disadvantage for memory 
implementation, is an important advantage for PUF applications (in addition to the existing process 
variation present in any technology). The programming variability is observed on the same cell for 
different cycles of operation (cycle-to-cycle variability) as well as on different cells for the same 
programming conditions (cell-to-cell variability). As the randomness originates from the 
stochastic rearrangement at the atomic scale, it is impossible to formulate or predict the variability 
pattern. The cycle-to-cycle programming variability allows the reconfigurability feature for a PUF, 
since new CRPs are obtained after each reprogramming. The cell-to-cell programming variability 
in nanodevices, on the other hand, is the result of the innate programming variability as well as the 
process-related variations.  
 
Figure 1-8: Schematics of typical cell structures for (a) Phase change memory (PCM), (b) resistive 
random access memory (RRAM), and (c) spin-transfer torque magnetic random access memory 
(STT-MRAM) cells (not drawn to scale). 
The resistance variation observed at either of the programmed states is also a source of 
variability for PUFs utilizing these nanodevices [37], [38]. For the resistance-variability based 
PUF, each challenge does not require a programming operation and a low-voltage read operation 
is enough. In contrast, the programming variability based PUFs require a programming pulse for 
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each challenge inquiry, which is expensive in terms of power. However, the reconfigurability 
feature is the attractive feature for the programming variability based PUFs, by which the 
uncertainty of the same PUF is refreshed with each new reprogramming to thwart physical attack 
[32].  
1.3.1 Phase Change Memory 
PCM was first introduced by Ovshinsky in late 1960s with the Ovonic threshold switch (OTS) 
phenomenon [39], which also showed promise for repeated memory operation [40]. However, the 
low programming speed and the high programming energy obtained from the prototype devices 
[41] waned interest in PCM as an electronic memory and rather deviated the following research 
initiatives toward the optical data storage field during the 1990s and 2000s [42]. In the early 2000s, 
advances in PCM materials with improved scalability, speed, and resistivity contrast led to 
renewed interest in PCM. PCM was then envisioned as a ‘universal memory’ that could potentially 
replace both DRAM and NAND flash. [43]. However, the high reset current in PCM hindered the 
scaling pace to compete with NAND flash and the writing speed and endurance could not reach 
DRAM standards either. Considering all the progress and remaining limitations, PCM is now 
regarded as storage class memory (SCM), a complementary technology to bridge the latency gap 
between NAND flash and DRAM (Figure 1-9) [43], [44], together with RRAM and MRAM. PCM 
can either serve as storage-type SCM, for which high density is the main requirement, or as 
memory-type SCM, for which high endurance (≥1012) and high reset and set speeds (<50 ns) are 
the critical requirements. Multi-level per cell (MLC) storage (e.g. 2 bits per cell with four distinct 
resistance states) and further progress in scaling, beyond the 4-6 F2 cell with sub-10 nm feature 
size, can lead to further improvements of PCM [43], [45].  
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Figure 1-9: Comparison of the latency of different memory and storage technologies. PCM along 
with RRAM and MRAM are competing to bridge the latency gap between the conventional 
memory and storage devices [46].  
PCM stores information on the phase of a chalcogenide material that can be reversibly 
switched between two (or more) stable states with distinct resistance levels. The high resistance 
state (HRS) in PCM is the amorphous or reset state and the low resistance state (LRS) is the 
crystalline or set state (Figure 1-10). The most used and studied phase change material has been 
the Ge2Sb2Te5 compound (GST-225) due to its crystallization speed, stability, and resistivity 
contrast between the amorphous and crystalline phases. In a typical PCM cell the GST material is 
sandwiched between two contacts. The mushroom cell has been the standard cell, in which the 
phase-change material is placed above a nanoscale bottom contact, called the heater, since it 
defines the highest current density region for Joule heating and the minimum amorphous plug 
required to block conduction in the high resistance state [47], [48]. 
For amorphization (reset), an amorphous plug is created on the phase change material just 
above the heater (also called the active region) by rapid cooling after melting at or above ~900 K 
(melt-quench) by a high amplitude short electric pulse (typically <50 ns) terminated abruptly [43]. 
The rapid quench results in random atomic rearrangements upon solidification and leaves the 
material in its amorphous phase (Figure 1-11a). For crystallization (set), an electric pulse with 
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moderate amplitude and longer duration (100 ns − 10 µs [43]) brings the active region above the 
crystallization temperature (~500 K) yet below the melting temperature, for a sufficient period to 
allow re-crystallization (Figure 1-11b,c). 
 
Figure 1-10: Schematics of the reset (amorphization), the set (crystallization), and the low-voltage 
read operations in PCM [47].  
 
Figure 1-11: (a) Crystalline or set state and (b) amorphized or reset state in a mushroom cell.  
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The high reset current requirement in mushroom cell necessitates large selector device, 
blocking the path toward further scaling [43]. Later cell designs showed improved power 
consumption and reliability, and currently the preferred cells are confined cells which improve 
thermal confinement and minimize the active region that must be amorphized and crystallized 
[49]. PCM operation has been demonstrated for active regions as small as ~1 nm using a carbon 
nanotube as the critical contact [50], thus demonstrating PCM high scalability potential compared 
to other traditional memory technologies. Alternative compositions of GST or other chalcogenide 
materials, as well as alternative deposition methods such as atomic layer deposition (ALD) and 
chemical or physical vapor deposition (CVD or PVD), have also shown improved and promising 
endurance [51], low reset currents [52], fast crystallization and good scalability.  
The large memory window in PCM (resistance contrast between the amorphous and 
crystalline phases) enables MLC storage, by which programming to multiple, distinct resistance 
levels between the full reset and set states allows for storage of more than one bit per cell for a 
significant increase in memory density (Figure 1-12a) [53]. The intermediate states are achieved 
by partial reset or partial set operations either with a single pulse, with amplitude in between that 
of the full reset and the full set pulses, or gradually by applying repeated smaller amplitude reset 
or set pulses [54]–[56]. By applying appropriate voltages to the perpendicularly arranged word 
line and bit line metals, the PCM cell at the cross-point is addressed in the crossbar architecture 
(Figure 1-12b) [46], [47]. Besides device downsizing, MLC, and crossbar architecture, high 
density is also achieved with the 3D stackability of PCM (Figure 1-12b). 
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Figure 1-12: (a) Large memory window in PCM cells enable multi-level cell (MLC) operation 
with highly dense mixed states. (b) 3−dimensionally integrable crossbar architecture for high 
density PCM [47]. 
1.3.2 Useful Properties of PCM for PUFs 
1.3.2.1 Programming Variability 
Despite the tremendous progress made in PCM device research for the past few years, PCM has 
the cell-to-cell and cycle-to-cycle resistance variability issue. The variability can occur during both 
the reset and set operations, even if the pulse parameters are chosen for successful switching. This 
phenomenon is known as programming or switching variability and it can be more severe in the 
weak programming regimes, i.e. in partial reset and partial set operations. An attempt to program 
a cell toward the partial reset regime from the crystalline state may not always be successful and a 
moderate pulse chosen for this operation may leave the cell unchanged, at the initial crystalline 
state, or instead program it fully into the high resistance amorphous state [57]. These unpredictable 
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partial programming operations in PCM limit memory performance but enable valuable 
implementations for PUF applications.  
The cycle-to-cycle stochastic nature in the reset operation originates from the random 
atomic rearrangement that takes place during the rapid melt-quench process [58]. On the other 
hand, the cycle-to-cycle stochastic nature in the set operation stems from the random spatial 
arrangement of the seed crystals that remain or nucleate after amorphization and from where 
crystallization will proceed [59], [60]. Moreover, the initial state for either operation also varies 
depending on the history of the cell. For example, the initial crystalline resistance of the same cell 
is an important factor on the result of the following operation and compounds on the overall 
variability. In case of the cell-to-cell programming variability, for both reset and set operations, 
process variations also add to the intrinsic cell variability. Process variations include geometry 
variations (thickness, length, or width of the active regions and contacts) and local material 
variations.  
1.3.2.2 Resistance Drift 
Due to spontaneous resistance drifts, PCM cells do not remain at the programmed resistance levels, 
and the drift history of cells also add to the variabilities in following programming cycles. The 
hexagonal close packed (hcp) phase is the stable phase of GST and does not experience drift but 
devices typically operate between the metastable amorphous and crystalline face centered cubic 
(fcc) and both phases experience resistance drifts. The crystalline fcc state shows a slight upward 
resistance drift within typical time scales and, for longer periods it slowly transitions to the stable 
hcp phase with a decrease in resistance. The amorphous phase, on the other hand, shows a 
significant steady upward resistance drift at the beginning, which saturates after a certain time 
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(depending on temperature) after which the resistance also decreases until complete crystallization. 
The resistance drift trends accelerate with temperature causing faster data loss at higher 
temperatures [61]–[65] (Figure 1-13a and Figure 1-14b). The upward resistance drift in amorphous 
phase follows a power-law behavior, and the slope of the bi-logarithmic resistance-time plot is 
called the drift exponent or drift coefficient [66] (Figure 1-13b): 
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where R is the reset resistance at time t, t is the time after amorphization, R0 and t0 are constants, 
and n is the drift exponent which is the slope of the bi-logarithmic R-t plot [66]. Upward resistance 
drift has been reported to initiate as soon as 30 ns after the resetting operation [58]. High-speed 
electrical characterization of long-term resistance drift measurement on PCM line cells performed 
by Dirisaglik et al. delineates the temperature dependence of the amorphous-to-crystalline phase 
transition from 104 μs after amorphization pulse (Figure 1-13a). Whereas at room temperature it 
takes ∼13 months to observe the turn-around in resistance drift, at ∼400 K it is observed after only 
∼100 s. At ∼675 K the upward drift is presumably too fast to be captured in these measurements 
and crystallization to hcp is complete after ∼200 ms [65], [67]. Higher drift coefficient indicates 
faster increase of the amorphous resistance during the upward resistance drift.  
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Figure 1-13: (a) Experimental results of resistance drift observed from GST-225 line cells at 
various temperature levels by Dirisaglik et al. (b) Drift coefficient measured from the resistance 
vs time bi-logarithmic plot measured from a line cell at 400 K [65], [67]. 
The physical origin of the upward resistance drift is not well understood yet. The current 
explanation of this drift is related to structural relaxation of the amorphous material, which is a 
thermally activated process of atomistic level rearrangement of the disordered amorphous network 
[66]. During this process, annihilation of the structural defects (vacancies, distorted and dangling 
bonds) is believed to occur in order to achieve a more stable amorphous state. Since Poole-Frenkel 
hopping is considered to be the dominant conduction mechanism in amorphous state, the reduction 
of the available localized states for carrier hopping is understood to give rise to a steady increase 
in amorphous resistance [66]. A widening of the optical amorphous bandgap has been correlated 
with the resistance increase and supports this hypothesis [68]. Structural relaxation process alone, 
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however, does not explain the turn-around at a maximum resistance and rapid reduction in 
resistance afterwards. 
 
Figure 1-14: (a) Experimental results of spread of drift coefficients and its dependency on 
temperature based on the electrical measurements performed by Dirisaglik et al. in Figure 1-13a. 
The small scatter points are the drift coefficients measured on different cells and the large scatter 
points are the average of all values measured at the corresponding temperature. (b) Dependency 
of crystallization time on temperature [65], [67]. 
The alternative hypothesis presented by Dirisaglik et al. shows that the crystallization 
process is initiated immediately after amorphization by nucleating seed crystallites and result in 
the initial upward and later downward resistance drift as the material relaxes toward the stable hcp 
phase. The mechanical strain induced by these crystallites creates defects and increases the 
bandgap of amorphous GST. Charges can be temporarily trapped into these defects and surface 
states at amorphous-crystalline boundaries. As the nuclei continue to grow, the crystalline islands 
start to act as bulk fcc degenerate semiconductor and form potential wells that capture free carriers 
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(Figure 1-15i-ii). Charge trapping by the nuclei results in a decrease in conductivity of the 
surrounding amorphous material leading to increasing resistance as nucleation and trapping 
progress. When the number and size of grains are sufficient to initiate percolation transport, the 
resistance starts decreasing [59], [65], [67], [69]–[71] (Figure 1-15iv-vi). 
 
Figure 1-15. Schematic illustration of the resistance increase over time due to the resistance drift 
mechanism described by the charge trapping model of Dirisaglik et al. via nucleation (i-ii), capture 
of free holes and distortion of the potential profile (iii), and the succeeding decrease of resistance 
as a consequence of growth of the crystalline nuclei, initiation of percolation transport (iv-v) and 
crystallization [65], [67]. 
In the relaxation model, the increase in the upward resistance drift exponent with 
temperature is attributed to the thermal activation of the structural relaxation process [66], [72] 
and the faster resistance decrease is explained by both larger nucleation and growth rates at 
elevated temperature [69]. 
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The upward resistance drift is described by the characteristic drift exponent (n) [66]. The 
drift exponent is a function of temperature [65]–[67], read current [66], and amorphous resistance 
level [58]. Amorphous resistance is expected to exhibit stronger upward resistance drift (i.e. larger 
n or steeper slope in the log(R)-log(t) plot) at higher temperature, lower read current, and higher 
amorphous resistance levels [58]. A high read current causes localized heat in the cell and thus 
affects the cell properties in a similar way as increasing the temperature [73].  
Other factors also affect the drift exponents as cells with the same initial amorphous 
resistance values have been observed to drift with variable drift exponents. The upward resistance 
drift variability has been ascribed to different amorphous structures ensued after the random melt-
quenched reset process and shown to increase with increasing amorphous resistance [58]. The 
variability of the drift exponent increases at higher temperature levels (Figure 1-14a) [67] and at 
higher amorphous resistance [58]. 
 
Figure 1-16: Schematic example of random spatial arrangement of the seed crystals nucleated 
inside the amorphous plug resulting in random resistance evolution over time during the 
crystallization process in PCM mushroom cell. Schematic redrawn from [60].  
32 
 
Spontaneous crystallization of PCM devices exhibits cycle-to-cycle (for a single cell) and 
device-to-device (in an array) stochastic variations [59], [60]. As the downward resistance drift is 
described by both nucleation and growth of the crystallites inside amorphous volume, the erratic 
resistance evolution over time is attributed to the random space configuration of the nuclei and the 
resulting percolation patterns [59]. The increase of the statistical spread and decrease of data 
retention time has been mentioned to arise from several factors: 
(a) Geometrical parameters: Smaller amorphous volumes have shorter data retention times 
because the same number of nucleation events have a greater effect on crystallization. 
Additionally, a few nucleation events within smaller amorphous region result in increased 
statistical spread of cell resistance [59]. From the resistance drift measurement results in 
PCM line cells of various dimensions by Dirisaglik et al. (different lengths and widths yet 
same thickness), decrease of resistance after reaching the maximum value is slower in 
wider line cells [64], [67] (Figure 1-17). The longer time needed for the growth of nuclei 
to reach the percolation threshold may be a reason for the slower downward resistance drift 
in wider structures. 
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Figure 1-17. Experimental result of dimension dependent phase transition of GST wires [67]. 
(b) Environmental parameters:  
i. Temperature: Due to the accelerated growth of the crystallites in amorphous region 
at higher temperatures, data retention time goes down (Figure 1-13a) while the 
statistical spread increases [74]. The maximum working temperature of PCM cells has 
been extrapolated as 105ᴼ C from the temperature dependent retention time [75].  
ii. Read current: As expected, higher read currents are also reported to perturb the cells’ 
state and result in data loss by accelerating the phase transition process; this 
phenomenon is referred to as read disturb [73], [76]. 
iii. Thermal cross-talk: Programming a cell can also cause unintentional heating of 
neighboring cells in an array due to thermal cross talk. Longer pulse durations and 
repeated programming of cells at smaller lithographic pitch are reported to accelerate 
the data loss of the adjacent bits; this phenomenon is referred to as program disturb 
[73]. 
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1.3.2.3 Noise 
PCM devices also exhibit various types of noise and fluctuations in electrical current 
measurements. Random telegraph noise (RTN) has been observed at intermediate states (~600 kΩ 
resistance level of µ-trench cells [77]) when read with a certain voltage and at a certain ambient 
temperature. The RTN has been ascribed to the same physical mechanism causing the amorphous 
resistance drift, i.e. structural relaxation. The random possibility for a defect to reside on one of 
the two equally energetically favorable states is reported for the possible mechanism for RTN [77]. 
Moreover, current measurements at crystalline and amorphous states of PCM show random 
fluctuations of current, known as the 1/f behavior or the flicker noise [78]. 
The programming variability, resistance drifts, read disturb, thermal cross-talk, and RTN 
noise in PCM devices cause reliability problems for memory implementations but can be utilized 
for hardware security applications such as PUFs or true random number generators (TRNGs).  
1.3.3 PCM-based PUF Reports 
1.3.3.1 Concept-only 
Among the very few PCM-based PUFs reported, the first one was a concept-only work, by 
Kursawe et al. in 2009 [34], with the introduction of RPUF or reconfigurable PUF (described in 
section 1.2.4 in page 17) for the first time. According to the authors, the read process in PCM is 
much more controlled than the writing process. Thus, the randomly programmed state in an MLC 
scheme can generate the random multi-bit responses and can be reconfigured as a new PUF, with 
refreshed set of CRPs, by re-programming the cell every time. This work described the idea only, 
with no simulation or experimental validation.  
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1.3.3.2 Simulation 
The following two works on PCM-based PUFs were published by Zhang et al. in 2013 and 2014. 
The first one, PCKGen or PCM cryptographic key generator, was demonstrated with simulation 
[79], while the second one showed detailed experimental validation of slightly different 
approaches [32]. For this PUF, the challenge was the addresses of a pair of PCM cells that were 
reconfigured, and the response was the comparison between the cell resistances. The first paper 
[79] was based on three core points: 
i. Due to the natural log-normal distribution of the PCM cell resistance, a logarithmic 
amplifier (LogAmp) was employed to the cell read path to reshape the cell resistance 
distribution in the linear domain. This method removed the undesired bias in the bit pattern 
of the cryptographic key output and maximized the entropy.  
ii. An imprecisely controlled current-pulse regulator (ICCR) was used to generate 
probabilistic current pulses to reconfigure the PCM cells. The ICCR incorporates a current-
mode digital-to-analog converter (DAC) and a pulse shaper. These two circuits generate 
m-bit and n-bit digital bit strings to control the amplitude and the duration of the applied 
current pulses to the PCM cells, respectively. A similar approach was also used in their 
following experimental work [32] (described in section 1.3.3.3 in page 36), with voltage 
pulses instead of the current pulses for programming.  
iii. A post-processing module (PPM) was used to improve the raw response quality. The 
authors indicated that the raw responses might incorporate noise and might not be truly 
random. The PPM helped the responses to be unpredictable and stable over time. ECC or 
error correction code with helper data (stored in non-volatile PCM cells with well-
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maintained security) and a subsequent hash function were used to improve the response 
quality.  
A numerical PCM model [80] was used for the simulations performed in this chapter along 
with the simulations of the auxiliary CMOS circuits with Cadence 90 nm design environment. The 
simulation of the security analysis showed improved bias with the LogAmp, a reduced error rate 
with ECC, and ~50% of uniqueness with the hash function [79].  
1.3.3.3 Experimental Validation 
In the experimental validation of the simulation-based work presented in reference [79], 180-nm 
PCM cells were used with both single and repeated pulsing attempts separately. The address of a 
PCM cell was used for the challenge, and the resulting resistance upon the reconfiguration or 
reprogramming was the response for this PUF [32]. For the single pulse programming approach, 
the partial reset programming method was used, which requires less programming time as 
compared to the partial set operation. Using stair-case down (SCD) pulses, the entire PCM array 
was initialized to the full-set state to maintain similar initial conditions for all cells prior to the 
programming. The PCM cells were then partially reset with single rectangular applied pulses with 
variable pulse amplitudes and durations, defined as non-uniform programming scheme (Figure 
1-18). The authors indicated that the programmed resistance of the identical PCM cells should 
only depend on the fabrication process variations and the applied programming pulse parameters. 
However, this statement overlooks the inherent programming variability originating from the 
nanoscale switching mechanism in PCM, which is a key contributing factor for the cell-to-cell 
programming stochasticity, besides the unavoidable process variations [32].  
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Figure 1-18: Using the (a) uniform and (b) non-uniform programming pulse parameters for 
achieving spread of programmed resistance for PCM-based RPUF [32].  
 
Figure 1-19: (a, b) The conventional approaches of generating random configuration states with 
hash-mode and TRNG-mode along with digital-to-analog converters (DAC). C and R refer to 
challenge and response, respectively. The configuration state S is prone to physical attack for both 
cases. (c) Random configuration state generation using imprecisely controlled regulator (ICR) 
along with DAC is reported to be more secure [32].  
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The random pulse parameters for the non-uniform programming were generated using an 
imprecisely controlled regulator (ICR), as in their simulation-based work (described in section 
1.3.3.2 in page 35), which was argued to be a more secure scheme against physical attacks as 
compared to the conventional hash-mode and TRNG-mode methods with digital-to-analog 
converters (DAC). The ICR circuit includes a programming voltage generator and a pulse 
generator [32].  
An m-bit binary input string can produce 2m possible configuration states for the 
programming voltage amplitudes and an n-bit binary input string randomly selects the delay chain 
from n sets of invertor delay chains, hence, 2n possible pulse durations can be generated [32].  
The large number of random challenges (2m×2n) generated by concatenating the two input 
strings from the ICR is applied to program or reconfigure the PCM cells. Even though the 
challenge bits get revealed from a limited number of CRP observations due to the linear behavior 
of the voltage and pulse generator circuits, the inherent physical variability in PCM programming 
will not allow an attacker to predict the response. The reliability test done at different temperatures 
showed that the intra-hamming distance measured at higher temperature is larger than the desired 
small values. Thus, several ECCs were considered to improve the uniformity. The unpredictability 
test conducted on different cells on the array also showed slight skew (~30%) and the unclonability 
test performed on different chips showed ~40% inter-hamming distance. As the raw responses 
were the resulting programmed resistance values, which depend on the physical uncertainty in the 
partial amorphization mechanism in PCM cells, these skews are expected. The raw responses were 
post-processed using hash function in the fuzzy extractor to improve the unpredictability and 
unclonability features of the PUF [32].  
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This design included not only large numbers of CRPs but also the refreshability feature of 
each PCM cell which renders a new set of CRPs after each reprogramming. Hence, it results in a 
PUF with strong unpredictability or mathematical unclonability against model-building attacks 
[32]. However, the authors indicated that attacks through exhaustive reading attempts in between 
two consecutive reconfigurations are still possible and need to be prevented with additional 
features. Two possible measures were proposed to address this problem [32]:  
i. Periodic refresh: the CRPs are refreshed in a periodic fashion after every tR duration. A 
clock can be used to monitor the time elapsed.  
ii. Frequency-based refresh: the CRPs are refreshed after a certain number of evaluations nR 
take place. A counter can be used to monitor the number of evaluations. 
In the same work [32], an alternative partial reset programming strategy with gradually 
increasing repeated pulses (termed as stair case up or SCU) was also used along with a program-
and-verify scheme. In this programming method, the cell resistance was measured in between the 
consecutive programming pulses and compared with a target programmed resistance (Rtarget) to 
determine if additional pulses were required. Based on the manufacturing variations, as indicated 
by the authors, in addition to the programming variability itself (which was not taken into account 
in reference [32]), the number of pulses required to reach a certain Rtarget varied randomly. 
Moreover, the use of the varying step incremental voltage and the varying pulse durations 
introduced additional variability to the responses. The challenge for the PUF was again the cell 
address, and the raw response was the number of pulses required to generate a certain Rtarget. The 
raw responses were post-processed for quantization of the output into digital bits. The error 
probability in the PUF output increased with increasing number of output bits used for 
quantization. By increasing the programming time with the gradual reset method, the total 
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programming time was made equal to the time between two consecutive reconfigurations in the 
single pulse programming method. Hence, the number of accessible CRP between two 
reconfigurations was only one, significantly improving the security of the repeated pulse 
programming as compared to the single pulse programming [32].  
1.3.3.4 TRNG (Simulation-based) 
A recent work has discussed the dependence of programming variability on the PCM cell design 
and how this can be leveraged for hardware security purposes [81]. This paper reports that since 
in mushroom cells or µ-trench cells the active region (volume that is switched between amorphous 
and crystalline) is adjacent to the contact, the switching mechanism is strongly dependent on the 
shape of the heater-chalcogenide interface and on the heater material used [82], [83]. These cells 
were observed to have smaller programming variability and the process variations (mostly on the 
heater definition) are likely to dominate over the variability associated with the switching location 
within the PCM material. In contrast, in line cells the active region is within the phase change 
material, away from the contacts, and the larger variability in these cells is due mostly to the 
switching variations within the PCM material [84], [85]. The authors indicated that the variability 
in PCM line cells can be even larger than that observed for oxide-based resistive RAMs which are 
known for large programming variability [86]. The authors have simulated the switching from the 
full-reset state using a pre-calibrated voltage for a large number of PCM line cells. The cells fail 
or succeed to switch toward the crystalline resistance state with equal probability and this random 
switching was proposed for TRNG implementations.  
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1.3.4 PCM-PUF vs Other PUFs 
Table 1-1, adapted from the review by R. Maes and I. Verbauwhede in 2010 [6], compares the 
main PUF properties for different technologies that have been considered. In Table 1-1, the 
security performance properties of PCM-based PUFs have been added as the last row. It is 
interesting to note that PCM and optical PUFs are the only types considered to be mathematically 
unclonable, an important feature for high-security applications. It is also important to emphasize 
here that PCM-based PUFs (and other emerging NVM-based PUFs, such as RRAM-PUFs or STT-
MRAM-PUFs) are reconfigurable PUFs which also enables higher-security implementations.  
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Table 1-1: Comparison of various PUF properties for different technologies. Table adapted from Maes, R., Verbauwhede, I.: ‘Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study on the State 
of the Art and Future Research Directions’, in (2010), pp. 3–37. The PCM-based PUF properties have been added here as the last row. 
PUF name Randomness type Challenge Response Tamper evident? Unique? 
Re-
producible? 
Physically 
unclonable? 
Mathematic
-ally 
unclonable? 
Un-
predictable? 
RFID-like 
protocol 
Secret key is explicitly hard-
programmed during 
manufacture 
Interrogation 
by a reader  
Permanent 
secret key -- Yes Yes No No No 
Optical PUF Explicitly introduced Laser orientation 
Gabor hash of 
speckle pattern Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Coating PUF Explicitly introduced Sensor selection 
Quantized 
capacitance Yes Yes Yes Yes No
§ Yes 
Basic arbiter 
PUF 
Implicit manufacturer 
variability 
Delay line 
setting Arbiter decision -- Yes Yes Yes No
¥ !ϼ 
Feed-forward 
arbiter PUF 
Implicit manufacturer 
variability 
Delay line 
setting Arbiter decision -- Yes Yes Yes No
¥ !ϼ 
RO PUF w/ 
division 
Implicit manufacturer 
variability 
Delay line 
setting 
Frequency 
division -- Yes Yes Yes No
¥ !ϼ 
RO PUF w/ 
comparator & 
1-out-of-8 mask 
Implicit manufacturer 
variability 
Loop pair 
selection 
Frequency 
comparison  -- Yes Yes Yes No
§ Yes 
SRAM PUF Implicit manufacturer variability 
SRAM 
address Power-up state -- Yes Yes Yes No
§ Yes 
Latch PUF Implicit manufacturer variability 
Latch 
selection 
Settling state of 
destabilized 
latch 
-- Yes Yes Yes No§ Yes 
Butterfly PUF Implicit manufacturer variability Cell selection 
Settling state of 
destabilized cell -- Yes Yes Yes No
§ Yes 
PCM PUF 
based on 
programming 
variability 
Implicit manufacturer 
variability & Programming 
variability 
Cell selection Programmed or not? Yes* Yes Yes
|| Yes Yesᴥ Yes 
*Tamper evidence feature can be implemented using the read disturb property and thermal cross-talk of PCM (if read voltages are sufficiently high). Tamper evidence of SEM 
imaging attack is discussed with experimental characterization in Chapter 6.  
||For a PCM-PUF based on the variability of resistance of cells programmed to either state, the CRP can be reproduced. The CRPs based on amorphous and crystalline fcc states can, 
however, become noisy at elevated temperatures and also overtime due to resistance drifts (these do not affect the stable crystalline hcp states). For the programming variability 
based PCM PUF, the challenge is a programming pulse after an initializing crystallization procedure. It might not be possible to obtain the same programming result on consecutive 
trials of the same applied programming pulse on the same PCM cell to check reproducibility if weak programming strategy is used to randomly pass or fail a cell to program. 
However, the reading operations done before the next programming cycle will retain the state due to nonvolatility and long retention time, and hence, the reproducibility of the state 
during read can be ensured for a certain programming cycle. Moreover, in the programming variability-based PCM PUF, the CRPs can be refreshed by reprogramming the cell 
(periodically or after a certain number of measurements) to prevent physical attacks and this can be done for very large number of times, limited by cell endurances, >~ 1010 cycles).  
§By exhaustively reading out all CRPs. ¥By model-building attack. 
ᴥPCM programming variability depends on complex stochastic switching mechanisms within the phase change material that cannot be predicted or modeled exactly.  
ϼWhen an adversary learns more and more CRPs, it becomes increasingly easier to predict the unseen CRPs.
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1.4 Contribution of This Dissertation 
In this dissertation, detailed electrical characterization of PCM line cells has been performed to 
advance the current state of PCM-based hardware security applications. Figure 1-20 shows a 
schematic diagram of the topics included in the following chapters.  
 
Figure 1-20: Contributions of this dissertation in the hardware security field and the topics included 
in the following chapters.  
The use of PCM devices for binary and multi-bit PUF implementations is discussed in 
Chapter 2 and 3, respectively. In Chapter 4, a technique for estimation of the amorphized length 
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in the PCM line cells and the variations of this length in multiple amorphous cells using electrical 
characterization is described. Chapter 5 presents a potential application of the spontaneous 
resistance evolution in PCM for time-sensitive or time-bound security applications. In Chapter 6, 
the tamper evidence property for SEM imaging attack is studied by monitoring the resistance 
evolutions of imaged and unimaged cells. Finally, the reconfigurable source of randomness – the 
refreshable programming property of PCM cells – is contrasted with a static source of randomness 
in a ZnO nanoforest-based PUF in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation with an outlook 
to future work.  
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Chapter 2 | Reset Variability in PCM for Binary PUF 
2.1 Abstract 
The rapid quench from melt associated with the reset operation in phase change memory is a 
suitable physical process to leverage programming variability for hardware security. In this 
chapter, cell-to-cell programming variability in Ge2Sb2Te5 (GST) line cells has been 
experimentally characterized using a single reset voltage pulse with moderate amplitude. It has 
been observed that the cell dimensions and programming pulse parameters play a critical role on 
the programming variability. Cells with larger length-to-width ratios (L/W ≥ 1.8) show greater 
programming variability when moderate reset voltage amplitudes (Vapplied) are applied. This 
variability is further increased with shorter pulse edges (tedge) of the applied pulses. A study for a 
reset-variability-based physical unclonable function (PUF) has been performed with 85 cells (with 
L/W = 4) by applying identical single pulses with shorter tedge and a pre-calibrated Vapplied. Cells 
are randomly programmed to the full reset (high-resistance-state or HRS), or the partial reset or 
set (low-resistance-state or LRS) states with an equal probability and the two states are separated 
by ~1.5 order of magnitude. No bit flipping is observed after 9 months of programming and 
instead, the separation increases to ~3 orders of magnitude because of the upward and downward 
resistance drift of the HRS and LRS states. The underlying physical mechanisms behind the 
enhanced variability are identified as thermal runaway at the onset of GST melting and the 
additional current overshoot due to the parasitic capacitances, based on COMSOL finite element 
simulations and SPICE circuit modeling of the experimental setup. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs), using a disordered medium with unpredictable 
functionality, have lately become a preferred method to provide hardware security. Conventional 
PUFs, based on CMOS circuitry, rely solely on process variations, and their security is being 
compromised by recent advances in model-building attack techniques [87]. As an alternative, 
PUFs based on various emerging non-volatile memory (NVM) nano-devices, such as phase change 
memory (PCM), are being proposed, where not only the process variations but also intrinsic 
programming variability, noise, and other stochastic properties contribute to the overall 
unpredictability [36]. Programming variability in NVM devices, a challenge for memory 
applications, provides a physical origin of randomness for PUFs, which is impossible to predict or 
model. Moreover, cycle-to-cycle programming variability and the high-endurance of these NVM 
devices offer reconfigurability for these PUFs [34]. 
PCM relies on phase switching in a chalcogenide material (most commonly Ge2Sb2Te5 or 
GST) between the high resistance amorphous or reset state and the low resistance crystalline or set 
state [47]. Both reset and set operations in PCM are prone to programming variability, especially 
when applied pulse parameters fall in the intermediate range between those for a full reset and a 
full set. During every reset or amorphization process, the fast quench after melting of the GST 
active region leads to randomly disordered atomic structures that result in resistance variability in 
both the amorphous and the subsequent crystalline state of the device, leading to both cell-to-cell 
and cycle-to-cycle reset variability [58]. Utilizing this inherent reset variability in PCM, small and 
light-weight PUF devices can be produced with low power requirement and high retention time 
[57], [88]. 
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The idea of utilizing the programming variability of PCM cells for PUFs was first proposed 
by Kursawe et al. [34]. In a later simulation work by Zhang et al., the security performances of a 
PCM-based PUF (PCKGen - relying on a non-uniform programming approach, i.e., variable 
amplitudes and durations of the programming current pulse) were evaluated [79]. Zhang et al. 
presented detailed experimental validations of [79] in a following work [32], using micro-trench 
PCM cells and applying voltage pulses with non-uniform approach. The authors indicated that a 
non-uniform programming approach utilizes process variations and programming variability, 
whereas a uniform programming approach only includes the process variations. However, it is 
important to note that the intrinsic amorphization variability in PCM devices is an added feature 
to the process variations and can be obtained with both non-uniform and uniform programming 
approaches. Hence, not only the intrinsic programming variability of PCM devices but also the 
programming pulse variability generated by the auxiliary CMOS circuits resulted the large number 
of challenge response pairs (CRPs) and robust protection against physical attacks in [32].  
Piccinini et al. recently simulated the intrinsic programming variability in line cells and 
suggested that PCM cells optimized for memory performance are not necessarily the best choices 
for hardware security applications [81]. The authors indicated that the heater in a mushroom cell 
significantly suppresses programming variability by confining the active region to the same 
location for each programming cycle. Planar or line cells, on the other hand, can be programmed 
at different locations for different reset operations, which enhances the programming variability. 
However, no device-level characterization of actual PCM cells has been performed yet, to the best 
of the author’s knowledge, to study the intrinsic variability that PCM nanodevices can offer using 
a uniform pulsing approach. 
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In this chapter, electrical measurements on GST PCM line cells have been performed to 
characterize the intrinsic variability in these devices. Single, identical reset voltage pulses with 
moderate amplitude and uniform programming approach result in randomly distributed 
programmed resistance levels on different cells. Various cell dimensions and programming pulse 
parameters have been tested, and those that maximize the programmed resistance spread for PCM-
based PUF applications have been identified. The underlying physical mechanisms for the 
enhanced reset variability are explained. The reliability (upon aging) and uniqueness of such PUFs 
have been tested. 
2.3 Fabrication and Electrical Characterization 
The tested GST line cells were 50 nm thick, on SiO2, capped by Si3N4, and had bottom tungsten 
(W) contact pads with (Ti/TiN) liner, with various lengths (L ~320-680 nm) and widths (W ~130-
720 nm) [67]. Cells wider than ~260 nm had a rectangular shape while narrower cells had a dog-
bone structure; example scanning electron microscope or SEM images are shown in Figure 2-1a,b. 
Initially, all GST cells were annealed in 675 K for 10 minutes at a Janis ST-500-UHT probe station 
at ~1 mTorr to crystallize the cells to the stable hexagonal closed packed (hcp) state (annealing 
profile in Figure 2-1c). Despite the identical annealing profile used for all cells, the initial 
crystalline resistance (Rcrystalline) values varied from cell to cell due to several factors [37]:  
 grain distribution variation on annealed crystalline cells [89],  
 process variation in terms of thickness, length, and width of the GST line, contact resistance 
variations, etc., and 
 random arrangement of any voids formed during annealing process [90]. 
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Figure 2-1: (a, b) SEM images of a dog-bone and a rectangular GST line cell. (c) Annealing profile 
for crystallization of as-deposited amorphous cells to hcp state. Cells were kept at 675 K for 10 
minutes. (d) Circuit schematics of the electrical characterization set-up. 50 Ω termination resistors 
were used at channel 1, 3, and 4. 
Reference [89] shows finite element simulations of cycle-to-cycle crystallization and grain 
distribution maps for the face centered cubic or fcc states of a mushroom cell with small active 
region (~50 nm thick amorphous layer). The variability in the fcc states resistance that can arise 
from the grain distribution variations was also described in reference [89]. A similar variation for 
the hcp cells used here, where a much larger region (the entire cell) is annealed to the hcp, is 
expected. Due to the larger area of the cell, it is likely that the hcp resistance can be significantly 
higher for some cells with additional grain boundaries due to larger number of smaller grains. 
The presence of small voids at random locations in the hcp cells is evident from SEM 
images of 6 unprogrammed hcp cells (L/W ratio ~4) shown in Figure 2-2.  
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Figure 2-2: SEM images of annealed hcp unmeasured cells of L = 420-440 nm and W = ~100-130 
nm. (a-e) Examples of 5 cells with noticeable voids marked with red circles, (f) an example of a 
cell without any noticeable void. 
Due to the variability present at the initial Rcrystalline, the use of voltage pulses, instead of 
current pulses, for programming introduced additional intrinsic variability, since different cells 
experienced different current levels even though the same voltage amplitude was applied (Vapplied 
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or Vch1). Single voltage pulses of 200 ns duration (tduration) were used for programming all cells. An 
arbitrary function generator (Tektronix AFG 3102) was used to generate the programming pulses 
and a digital oscilloscope (Tektronix DPO 4104) to measure Vch1 and voltage at channel 3 and 4 
(Vch4). The GST cells were electrically characterized in a room temperature probe set-up. A 
semiconductor parameter analyzer (Agilent 4156C) was used for the read operations (DC sweep 
from -0.1 to +0.1 V) at any programmed resistance (Rprogrammed) of the GST cells. A relay circuit, 
controlled with an Arduino Mega 2560 card, was used to automatically switch between the reading 
and programming operations. A load resistor of 5.1 kΩ was used to limit the current through the 
cells during programming (Figure 2-1d). 
Two pulse shapes were tested, with shorter and longer pulse edges, by setting both the rise 
and fall times of the applied voltage pulses (trise = tfall = tedge) to 0 or 20 ns in the function generator. 
Due to the resolution of the function generator and loading effects, the output voltage pulses had 
the measured edges of ~25 and ~35 ns and the resulting current pulses had edges of ~10 and ~22 
ns. These are referred as ‘short tedge’ and ‘long tedge’ pulses for the rest of the chapter. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Effect of Cell Dimensions on Programming Variability 
The moderate values of Vapplied that can generate a wide spread of Rprogrammed are important to be 
identified. Thus, studying whether Rprogrammed increases gradually or abruptly with small 
increments of Vapplied on different cells helps narrowing down the Vapplied range to be used for PUFs. 
Moreover, the trends of Rprogrammed versus Vapplied on cells of different dimensions help us choose 
the right cell dimensions for PUFs. To examine the effects of length, width, and aspect ratio of 
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GST line cells on programming variability, 9 groups of different dimension GST cells were used, 
with at least 20 cells of similar dimensions within each group. Each cell was programmed 
individually with a single programming voltage pulse (with different Vapplied for each group to 
cover the range from always unsuccessful reset to always successful reset). 
Figure 2-3 shows the resulting Rprogrammed (red spheres) as a function of Vapplied, along with 
the corresponding initial Rcrystalline (blue stars) for each of the 9 groups of cells. Each of the single 
applied pulses in Figure 2-3 had a tduration of 200 ns and short tedge. The 9 groups of cells with 
similar dimensions are combinations of 3 width groups (W ~100-130, ~260-300, and ~680-720 
nm) and 3 length groups (L ~340, ~460, and ~660 nm). The cells with larger length-to-width ratios 
(L/W ≥ 1.8) (Figure 2-3a-c,e,f) show abrupt changes in the Rprogrammed versus Vapplied plot 
(highlighted with green boxes); after a certain Vapplied, the cells were either fully reset (with 
Rprogrammed > ~107 Ω: high resistance states or HRS) or partially/barely reset (Rprogrammed > ~102-5 
Ω: low resistance states or LRS) randomly. There is a clear distinction between the HRS and LRS 
and it is difficult to achieve intermediate states in these long-narrow cell geometries, possibly due 
to the effective conduction blockage by a single amorphized volume (Figure 2-4a). The cells with 
smaller L/W (0.4 – 1.3), on the other hand, show comparatively smoother increase of Rprogrammed 
values on different cells with increasing values of Vapplied (Figure 2-3d,g-i) and can be programmed 
to several intermediate states between HRS and LRS, apparently by preserving continuous 
conduction paths around one or more smaller amorphized volumes (Figure 2-4b). 
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Figure 2-3: Programming of 9 groups of GST line cells of various dimensions with single voltage 
pulses. At least 20 cells from each group experienced a single programming pulse of various Vapplied 
to fully or partially amorphize from their initial crystalline states. The initial crystalline and 
programmed resistance levels (Rcrystalline and Rprogrammed) are plotted as blue stars (scattered) and red 
spheres (connected with red dotted line to show trend), respectively. Insets show the corresponding 
SEM images of unprogrammed GST cells with the corresponding cell width and length-to-width 
ratio for each cell group. The lengths of the cells were ~340 (a, d, g), ~460 (b, e, h), and ~660 nm 
(c, f, i). Each programming pulse was 200 ns wide with short tedge. The green boxes in a-c, e, and 
f highlight the ranges of Vapplied values that lead to random Rprogrammed on different cells, i.e. where 
Rprogrammed values vary abruptly with Vapplied. 
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Figure 2-4: Schematic representations of (a) continuous conduction path around one or more 
amorphized volumes in a wider line cell and (b) blocked conduction path in a narrower line cell. 
The high variability regions in the Rprogrammed vs. Vapplied plots (highlighted areas in Figure 
2-3a-c,e,f) for cells with larger L/W ratios, where similar Vapplied can randomly lead to HRS or LRS 
state with a large separation between the two states, are suitable for PUF applications. The clear 
distinction between the two states avoids the need for a reference cell array, which is commonly 
used in NVM-based PUFs for calculating the threshold resistance that distinguishes between HRS 
and LRS when Rprogrammed is in the intermediate resistance range [91]. However, some of the cells 
with the largest L/W (Figure 2-3c) broke (Rprogrammed > 1012, not shown), instead of programming 
to the HRS, when Vapplied > 2 V is applied. This can be possibly due to the lithographic limitations 
of long-narrow structures. When a dog-bone structure is much longer than the width (Figure 2-3c), 
the middle part of the cell becomes narrower than the designed width due to some geometry-
dependent processes. Among the SEM images provided in the insets of Figure 2-3a-c, the design 
width of all three cells are the same but the actual widths are different due to uncontrolled 
lithographic limitation (widest in Figure 2-3a for the shortest cell and narrowest for Figure 2-3c 
for the longest cell). Because of this phenomenon, cells with very small designed width (~40-60 
nm) and length of 370-500 nm often yield open structures because of a large L/W ratio due to the 
uncontrolled fabrication processes [92]. Therefore, some cells at Figure 2-3c often cannot 
withstand the voltage of 2 V and break. Hence, among 9 cell dimensions, the cells in Figure 2-3b 
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(L/W ~4) are identified as the most useful ones for PUF applications and are used for the PUF test 
(in part 2.4.3 in page 59). 
2.4.2 Effect of tedge on Programming Variability 
To test the effect of tedge of the applied reset pulse on the amorphization process, another study was 
performed, in which 10 sets of PCM cells (with 26 cells in each set, of W of ~200 to ~700 nm in 
20 nm increments and of similar L of ~380 nm) experienced a single voltage pulse of same tduration 
(200 ns). 5 sets of cells experienced long tedge (Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6a) and the other 5 sets had 
short tedge (Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6b). Because of the same Vapplied value used in each tedge case 
(6 and 3 V for long and short tedge case), the narrower cells in each set of measurement reached 
HRS whereas the wider ones stayed at LRS (Figure 2-6). At the transition region of each case, the 
moderately wide cells experienced a moderate reset voltage, which resulted in uncertainty of 
reaching to HRS or LRS. This transition part is much broader with fewer cells programmed at the 
intermediate states (~105-6 Ω) for the short tedge case (Figure 2-6b) as compared to the long tedge 
case (Figure 2-6a), where a smoother transition range is defined with much less variability and 
with some cells programmed at intermediate states. Hence, long tedge enables more controlled 
programming, whereas short tedge enhances the uncertainty of reset, with the latter desired for 
PUFs. 
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Figure 2-5: An example of (a) applied programming voltage pulse at channel 1 (Vapplied or Vch1) 
and (b) measured voltage at channel 3, 4 (Vch4) as a function of time, with long (gray dashed line) 
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and short (blue solid line) pulse edges (tedge) to program to ~15 MΩ in two cells (L/W: 380/460 
and 400/360 nm). These waveforms are inputted in the SPICE circuit modeling and COMSOL 
finite element simulations to compute the (c) cell voltage (Vcell), (d) cell current (Icell), and (e) 
temperature profile at the center of the cell (Tcell) with 5 peaks marked as p1-p5 and 5 quenching 
instances marked as q1-q5 after each melt. The SPICE simulations are performed for both long and 
short tedge cases and the COMSOL is run only for the short tedge case (Navy-blue dotted line). 
 
Figure 2-6: Programmed resistance Rprogrammed as a function of cell width. Single pulse of 200 ns 
duration was applied with (a) 6 V amplitude and long pulse edge (tedge) and (b) 3 V amplitude with 
short tedge. (c-h) Example SEM images of approximately 380 nm long and 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 
and 700 nm wide GST line cells. 
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Figure 2-7: 2-dimensional phase distribution maps extracted from finite element simulations for a 
line cell with L/W of 400/360 nm and for the short tedge case. Left to right: elapsed time during the 
applied pulse. (a) at the beginning (0 ns) and (b-f) during quenching instances marked as q1 – q5 
in Figure 2-5e. Light pink, maroon, and white colors refer to the amorphous, crystalline, and grain 
boundary regions, respectively. The electrode at the upper side has positive polarity. 
Our experimental setup circuitry was modeled in SPICE by including all parasitic 
capacitances and inputting the measured Vch1 and Vch4 for the two examples shown in Figure 2-5a,b 
for the long and short tedge cases, respectively. It was observed that the cell current (Icell) mostly 
flows during the pulse edges of Vch1 for both cases. The sharp edges present in Icell for the short 
tedge case (Figure 2-5d solid blue line), due to the additional capacitive current overshoot, are 
responsible for the faster melting and quenching, the associated stronger variability, and the ability 
to reset with lower Vapplied. An identical GST cell that was used for the short tedge case in Figure 
2-5a,b was also simulated with a nucleation and growth based finite element model [89], [93] using 
COMSOL Multiphysics. For computational efficiency, simplified waveforms resembling 
measured Vch1 and Vch4, but with continuous first derivatives, were inputted and additional circuit 
elements were simulated with a SPICE node. Higher amplitude for Icell was observed from 
COMSOL as compared to that from SPICE (Figure 2-5d), which indicates additional contribution 
of thermal runaway at the onset of melting [94]. The cell temperature (Tcell) contains five sharp 
peaks p1 to p5 (Figure 2-5e). At each peak, melting occurred at random locations, and the following 
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quenched material showed distinct phase distribution maps after each peak (Figure 2-7), 
supporting the intrinsic programming variability feature of PCM. 
2.4.3 Reset PUF Test  
Based on the observations of high reset variability with long-narrow cells and shorter tedge of the 
applied programming pulse, a reset PUF test was conducted with 85 GST line cells with L/W ratio 
of 4 (L ~460 and W ~130 nm) and a single voltage pulse with pre-calibrated Vapplied of 1.5 V 
(estimated from the highlighted region of Rprogrammed versus Vapplied plot at Figure 2-3b), tduration of 
200 ns, and short tedge. Among the 85 annealed cells, around 90% appear to be in hcp state, with 
resistance < 1 kΩ and the rest might be either in mixed hcp-fcc states or in hcp states with voids 
or additional grain boundaries due to larger number of smaller grains leading to higher resistances 
[89]. After programming, the resistance spread (Figure 2-8) shows a distribution of ~50% cells in 
the HRS and ~50% cells in LRS with ~1.5 order of magnitude gap between the two states. Because 
of the high endurance of PCM devices and the cycle-to-cycle variability, the same cell can be used 
for a practically unlimited number of times (~1012) [51] with new, unpredictable refreshed set of 
CRPs. 
As GST experiences resistance drift in amorphous and fcc states [64], [65], these 85 cells 
were re-measured after 9 months during which all cells were kept at room temperature. It was 
observed that the cells at HRS state had gone to even higher resistance values due to strong upward 
resistance drift at HRS and the ones at LRS had drifted to lower resistance values due to 
crystallization from the various mixed-amorphous-crystalline states. No bit flipping was observed 
at all and an even safer separation of ~3 orders of magnitude between the HRS and LRS states was 
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observed after 9 months (black circles in Figure 2-8). This ensures the reproducibility of generating 
the same response when interrogating an aged PCM-PUF device with the same challenge. 
 
Figure 2-8: (a) Initial crystalline (Rcrystalline) and (b) programmed resistance (Rprogrammed) 
distributions of 85 long-narrow (~460 nm long and ~130 nm wide) GST cells after ~10 seconds 
(red spheres) and ~9 months (black circles) of programming operation. Single voltage pulse of 1.5 
V amplitude, pulse width of 200 ns, and short pulse edge was used for programming each cell. 
2.5 Circuit-Level Modeling of Reset Operation 
The experimental setup used in this chapter includes some parasitic capacitances, which 
significantly contribute to the observed phase change dynamics. This section explains these 
contributions using SPICE simulations of the approximate circuit model. The evolution of the 
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phase distribution map inside the cell is simulated with finite element model using COMSOL 
Multiphysics. 
 
Figure 2-9: (a) Approximate circuit model schematic of the experimental setup with the measured 
parasitic capacitance and resistance values. (b) Simplified circuit model simulated in SPICE with 
the measured Vch1 and Vch3,4 waveforms. (c) Modeling of GST resistance switching with three 
switches in SPICE.  
Figure 2-9a illustrates the approximate circuit model of the experimental setup (shown in 
Figure 2-1d) with the following components:  
1. Channel 1 termination resistance, Rch1 = 50 Ω. 
2. Capacitance of coaxial cable to channel 1 termination, Cch1 = 110 pF. 
3. Cell resistance, Rcell: values used for SPICE simulations are listed in Table 2-1. 
4. Capacitance of probe arm to load resistor, Cload = 20 pF. 
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5. Load resistance, Rload = 5.1 kΩ. 
6. Channel 3 and 4 termination resistance in parallel, Rch3,4 = 50 || 50 Ω = 25 Ω. 
7. Capacitance of coaxial cable to channel 3 and 4 terminations, Cch3,4 = 110 pF. 
 
Figure 2-10: GST resistivity change as a function of temperature, measured data on 100 nm GST 
thin film (re-plotted from reference [94]). Inset shows an expanded view of the resistivity drop 
during melting. 
Table 2-1: Cell resistance Rcell used in SPICE simulation. 
Rcell 
Rcrystalline 
(Ω) Rmolten (Ω) 
Ramorphous (MΩ): 
measured at 10 s 
Ramorphous (MΩ): 
used in simulations 
Short tedge 165 140 14.70 1.70 
Long tedge 220 140 14.95 1.73 
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To closely simulate the experimental non-ideal conditions, the measured voltage 
waveforms for channel 1, Vch1 and channel 3 and 4, Vch3,4 (= Vch3 = Vch4) are inputted for the long 
and short pulse edges (tedge) that are presented in Figure 2-5. Figure 2-9b shows the simplified 
circuit model, in which the parasitic capacitances and termination resistances for both channel 1 
and channel 3,4 are already taken into account in the measured Vch1 and Vch3,4. Rcell is switched 
between the measured hexagonal close packed (hcp) crystalline resistance Rcrystalline, a molten 
resistance Rmolten of 140 Ω, and the measured amorphous resistance Ramorphous values (Figure 2-9c) 
for the two cells related to Figure 2-5. Table 2-1 lists these different resistances used for the circuit 
simulations. The Rmolten value is assumed to be 140 Ω for all simulations, which is slightly less 
than the hcp Rcrystalline, since melting incorporates a drop in the GST resistivity (as shown in Figure 
2-10 inset) [94]. Since the measured amorphous cells drifted upward about ~1 order of magnitude 
at room temperature for 10 seconds after being programmed, before the resistance was measured, 
instantaneous programmed resistance values are inputted in the simulations instead. The 
instantaneous programmed resistance is calculated at 30 ns after amorphization, which is the 
earliest reported elapsed time for resistance drift [58]. The drift coefficient is taken as 0.11 [65]. 
Melting and amorphization of GST cell is simulated with three switches S1, S2, and S3 that 
sequentially turn on and off to include the appropriate Rcell (Figure 2-9c). For both the short and 
long tedge cases, the melting is assumed to take place during the rising edge of the Vch1 and the 
amorphization is assumed to take place after the falling edge of Vch1. At the starting of the 
simulation, S1 is closed while S2 and S3 are kept open to use Rcrystalline as the starting Rcell. During 
melting, Rcell is switched from Rcrystalline to Rmolten by opening S1 and closing S2, while keeping S3 
open. For amorphization, Rcell is switched from Rmolten to Ramorphous by opening S2 and closing S3, 
while keeping S1 open. 
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The measured waveforms presented in Figure 2-5a,b only show Vch1 and the current 
through the channel 3,4 termination, ௏೎೓ర
ଶହ Ω
. To understand the phase change dynamics in the GST 
cell due to transient behaviors, it is necessary to compute the resulting cell voltage and current, 
Vcell and Icell, respectively. Therefore, the voltage at the two ends of the cell Vch1 and Vinternal, Vch3,4, 
Vcell = (Vch1 - Vinternal), and Icell are monitored in the circuit simulations. 
It is observed from the simulations that even though the amplitudes of Vch1 and Vch3,4 are 
half for the short tedge case as compared to those for the long tedge case (Figure 2-11a,b), the Vcell 
amplitudes are very similar for the two cases (Figure 2-11c). For both the short and long tedge cases, 
the Vcell includes voltage drops during each of the Vch1 transitions, that are in opposite polarity 
(Figure 2-11c). As a result, Icell flows in one direction during the rising edge of Vch1 and in the 
opposite direction during the falling edge of Vch1 (Figure 2-11d) for both the short and long tedge 
cases. 
For a clearer view of the pulse transition edges of Figure 2-11 (highlighted in green and 
pink boxes in Figure 2-11), these transition periods are expanded in Figure 2-12. Icell for the short 
tedge case consists of a very sharp triangular current pulse (of ~15 ns duration and ~8.4 mA 
amplitude) at each of the pulse edge of the Vch1 (Figure 2-12d). On the other hand, the Icell for the 
long tedge case consists of a slower and wider triangular pulse (of ~53 ns duration and ~6.7 mA 
amplitude) at each of the pulse edges of Vch1 (Figure 2-12d). The triangular current pulse edges of 
Icell for the short tedge case are denoted as srise(1), sfall(1), srise(2), and sfall(2); and the triangular current 
pulse edges of Icell for the long tedge case are denoted as lrise(1), lfall(1), lrise(2), and lfall(2) (Figure 2-11). 
The sharper edges with slightly larger amplitude for Icell in the short tedge case (srise(1), sfall(1), srise(2), 
and sfall(2)) can be attributed to the additional capacitive current contributions, which also indicates 
faster Joule heating in the cell and earlier melting during srise(1).  
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The simulation results also show that the different Vch1 amplitudes of 6 and 3 V for the long 
and short tedge cases, respectively, result in comparable Icell amplitudes, which produce enough 
Joule heating to induce melting in both cells. Beside the additional capacitive current in the short 
tedge case, there can also be added thermal runaway, which can further increase Icell. In case of the 
starting hcp state as the low resistance state or LRS (as the experimental condition used here), the 
effect of thermal runaway is expected to be less, since the hcp resistivity increases slightly with 
temperature and starts to decrease only near melting (Figure 2-10 inset) [94]. Hence, the smaller 
voltage required for reset for the short tedge case in these experiments should be mostly because of 
the additional capacitive currents originating from the experimental setup circuit. However, in case 
of an fcc phase as starting LRS, which is the more practical and common LRS, the significant 
decrease of resistivity with temperature (Figure 2-10) would lead to a thermal runaway and earlier 
melting. In that case, the voltage amplitude required for amorphization with short tedge is expected 
to reduce even further. Reference [95] describes RESET simulations in which the starting LRS 
state is fcc and the effect of different rise times of the reset pulse on the amorphization profile is 
very significant. 
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Figure 2-11: Simulated cell voltage and current for long (dotted black line) and short (solid blue 
line) tedge cases in SPICE. 
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Figure 2-12: Expanded view of the rise and fall transitions of Vch1. Simulated cell voltage and 
current for long (dotted black line) and short (solid blue line) tedge cases using SPICE. 
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Figure 2-13: Measured voltage waveforms at channel 1 (Vch1, top row) and measured current at 
channel 3 and 4 terminations (௏೎೓య,ర
ଶହ Ω
, bottom row) for different tedge cases and for different cell 
dimensions - two wide and two narrow cells. The black dotted lines and blue solid lines represent 
the long and short tedge cases, respectively. The left and right columns show the measurements for 
the wide and narrow cells, respectively. It appears that amorphization for the narrow cell with short 
tedge case occurred earlier than for the other three examples. 
Moreover, the very sharp srise(1), sfall(1), srise(2), and sfall(2) can lead to quick rise and fall of 
the cell temperature, which may contribute to the increased programming variability. On the other 
hand, the longer and more steady lrise(1), lfall(1), lrise(2), and lfall(2) can lead to more uniform melting 
and slower quenching and the resulting slow rise and fall of cell temperature are expected to lead 
to the more deterministic programming. The evolution of the cell temperature is simulated in the 
next section using finite element modelling. 
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Before that, another important point needs to be considered. The sharp sfall(1) edge (Figure 
2-12d) is related to the kink present in the rising edge of Vch1 pulse for this case (Figure 2-12a), 
which is defined as krise and can be ascribed to the non-ideal features and resolution of the function 
generating unit. The resulting sharp sfall(1) can initiate quenching during this krise of Vch1 for some 
cells, especially the narrow cells with the dog-bone structure. Results from these experiments 
(Figure 2-13) show that the current measured through the termination resistors at channel 3 and 4 
( ௏೎೓య,ర
ଶହ Ω
) for the short tedge case for narrow cells (Figure 2-13– right, blue solid line) consistently 
decayed slowly during krise of Vch1, indicating a possible early quenching instance for these cells. 
This suggests that the initial heating spike, during the very short rise time (of ~5 ns) of srise(1) is 
sufficient to fully melt the narrow cells with the short tedge case, so that the conduction path is 
blocked after amorphization; and eventually these narrow cells are expected to quench early during 
the sfall(1). On the other hand, the similar srise(1) edge in a wide cell, or the lrise(1) edges in a wide or 
narrow cell does not result in sufficient heating for melting fully and, rather, leads to late quenching 
during the sfall(2), which occurs during the kink at the falling edge of Vch1 (marked as kfall in Figure 
2-12a). 
To compute the Vcell and Icell during this early quenching instance in the narrow cells with 
the short tedge case, the circuit model of Figure 2-9b is simulated, in which the amorphization takes 
place during the kink krise of Vch1 (Figure 2-14). Interestingly, the computed Vcell waveform in this 
case (Figure 2-14c) look remarkably different than that computed in Figure 2-11c. In this case, the 
Icell mostly flows in one direction with the sharp triangular pulse with edges srise(1) and sfall(1) only; 
and the current amplitude through the cell in the opposite direction is comparatively very low due 
to the early quenching event (Figure 2-14d and expanded view in Figure 2-14h). 
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Figure 2-14: Simulated cell voltage and current for short tedge case with early quenching (during 
the rising kink krise of Vch1) in SPICE. The highlighted green region of (a-d) is expanded in (e-h). 
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2.6 Finite Element Modeling of Reset Operation 
In order to extract the temperature evolutions in the cell and gain more insight about the phase 
change dynamics in GST, a nucleation and growth based electrothermal finite element simulation 
of a 2-D GST structure, that mimics the measured cell (shown in Figure 2-15), is performed. 
Additional circuit elements (shown in Figure 2-9b) are also included and simulated with a SPICE 
node. The finite element model used here is described in detail in references [89], [93], [96]. The 
simulation was performed only for the short tedge case using the measured Vch1 and Vch3,4 (Figure 
2-5a,b with solid blue line). For computational efficiency, the measured Vch1 and Vch3,4 waveforms 
are smoothed to achieve continuous first derivatives. These smoothed waveforms are needed for 
convergence of the electrothermal simulations. 
 
Figure 2-15: 2-D GST device structure used for finite element simulation.  
The simulated Vcell and Icell in COMSOL agree well with those simulated in SPICE (Figure 
2-16c,d). The Icell computed in COMSOL has larger amplitude than that computed in SPICE; the 
first peak of Icell is 14.2 mA in COMSOL and 8.4 mA in SPICE simulation; the second peak is 
24.1 mA in COMSOL and only 3.6 mA in SPICE (Figure 2-16d). This difference can be ascribed 
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to the additional thermal runaway in GST at the onset of melting, which is ignored in SPICE 
simulation. 
Several sharp peaks are observed in the cell temperature Tcell during the Vch1 transitions 
(Figure 2-16e, peaks p1, p2, p3, p4, and p5). The cell experiences melting at each of these peaks. 
Figure 2-17 to Figure 2-21 show the evolution of the phase distribution maps of the GST cell 
during each of these peaks. In the phase distribution maps, ‘light pink’ represents the amorphous, 
‘magenta’ the molten, ‘maroon’ the crystalline, and ‘white’ the grain boundary regions. It is 
interesting to note that the shapes and locations of the molten regions in the GST cell are unique 
for each of the melting events. The amorphous volumes formed after each quenching are also 
remarkably distinct (Figure 2-17 to Figure 2-21f). These unique shapes and random locations of 
the molten regions observed during different melting events of the same reset operation in the same 
cell point to the origins for reset variability observed in cell to cell or cycle to cycle operations in 
PCM cells. A room-temperature read operation is performed in COMSOL after applying the pulse 
and the computed final resistance is 1.85 MΩ, which is very close to the calculated instantaneous 
programmed resistance of 1.73 MΩ. 
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Figure 2-16: (a) Cell voltage Vcell, (b) current Icell, and (c) temperature Tcell simulated in COMSOL 
for the short tedge case (royal blue dotted line) at the center point of the GST cell. Vcell and Icell for 
the short tedge case simulated in SPICE are also plotted as solid blue line in (a) and (b), respectively.  
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Figure 2-17: Evolution of the phase distribution map during the peak p1. 
 
Figure 2-18: Evolution of the phase distribution map during the peak p2. 
 
Figure 2-19: Evolution of the phase distribution map during the peak p3. 
 
Figure 2-20: Evolution of the phase distribution map during the peak p4. 
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Figure 2-21: Evolution of the phase distribution map during the peak p5. 
2.7 Discussion 
2.7.1 Advantages of This Work 
PUFs based on programming variability or any intrinsic variability related to the device structure 
or materials property are expected to be more secure than PUFs based on process variations only. 
With physical attacks or model-building attacks, a PUF can be replicated if it relies on process 
variations only (including the PUFs relying on device delay mismatch). The programming 
variability in PCM occurs in a truly stochastic and unpredictable way, which is impossible to 
model. The contributions of the work presented in this chapter to the PCM-based hardware security 
field are:  
i. Uniform programming approach: Zhang et al. showed an excellent work on the first-
time implementation of a PCM-based PUF [32]. However, as mentioned in section 1.3.3.3 
in page 36, a non-uniform pulsing approach is utilized in reference [32], where different 
pulse amplitudes and durations are applied to achieve variable programmed resistances. 
Zhang et al. indicated that a uniform approach would only include process variations, 
which might not be sufficient for PUF applications. However, the intrinsic programming 
variability in PCM comes in addition to any process variations which is why PCM shows 
76 
 
cycle-to-cycle variability for programming of same cell with the same pulse. The overall 
variability in reference [32] was not only the result of the inherent variability of PCM but 
also of the auxiliary CMOS circuitry that generated the variable pulse parameters. In this 
chapter, it has been shown that a uniform approach (i.e. the same pulse parameters) still 
results in significantly different programmed resistances, indicating that the intrinsic 
programming variability in PCM is strong enough to be used for hardware security.  
ii. Cell design: PCM achieved technological maturity as a storage device and is recently being 
used in the intel cross-point memory technology. These advances in PCM for storage and 
memory devices included suppression of variability with new materials and cell designs. 
Hence, the micro-trench, dash-type, or pore cells – that are excellent for consistent 
operation for storage and memory devices – are not ideal for hardware security 
applications, which require significant variability. Piccinini et al. also discussed this choice 
of cell designs for hardware security [81]. Zhang et. al used micro-trench cells [32], which 
is a good geometry for storage and memory application. In this chapter, line cells are used, 
which are not as good as micro-trench cells for memory applications due to increased 
variability. It is shown in this chapter how cell dimensions (aspect ratio in line cells) and 
pulsing parameters can result in suitable variability with uniform pulsing approach for 
PUFs. 
iii. Device-level characterization: Piccinini et al. showed interesting simulation results on 
PCM-based true random number generator (TRNG) [81]. One concern for hardware 
security research is that the actual variability of real devices needs to be characterized by 
device-level measurements. Gao et al. points out this concern very clearly in reference [36]. 
However, all papers on device-level characterization of PCM focus on how the variability 
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can be reduced, and the devices can be successfully used for memory. In this chapter, 
device-level characterization of PCM devices is performed to show how the intrinsic 
variability in these devices can be increased by certain cell dimensions and pulsing 
parameters. These results show that longer and narrower cells with shorter pulse edges lead 
to significant programming variability.  
iv. Physical mechanism: As the recent trend in the hardware security field requires variability 
originating from the physics of nanodevices, it is crucial to understand the underlying 
mechanisms in these devices’ operation dynamics. In this work, several ways of enhancing 
programming variability in PCM-based PUF operation are presented that are linked to the 
PCM device physics, such as: 
 continuous conduction path vs blocked conduction path (Figure 2-4), which indicates 
the possible reason for achieving less controlled programming in the narrow dog-bone 
cells and 
 the effect of rise and fall times of the applied voltage pulse on the programming 
dynamics. 
Moreover, stable PUF responses with distinguishable HRS and LRS after 9 months are 
shown in this work, which is the result of resistance drift in PCM, another physical 
phenomenon. 
2.7.2 Limitations of This Work 
This work shows that the choice of cell used for hardware security applications must be determined 
by considering the features necessary for a given security primitive. Hence, the traditional good-
performance cells for memory and storage applications are not necessarily the best ones for 
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security, where increasing the variability, not suppressing it, is a key requirement. Line cells are 
expected to lead to greater variability due to the random location of amorphization compared to 
mushroom cells. But line cells are also not good in all respects; for example, line cells are more 
difficult to cycle and show lower endurance, an essential parameter for a reconfigurable PUF. Line 
cells are used in this work because of the accessibility to only this cell type. Further efforts in the 
hardware security field can include the design of cells that show good variability and endurance 
along with other essential memory and security features, depending on the specific application. 
The overhead circuitry in this work (from the experimental setup parasitic), which 
enhances programming variability, would only require the integration of pulse generators with an 
appropriate capacitive network. Even though no additional CMOS-based auxiliary circuitry is 
required to produce variable pulse amplitude and durations, as shown in Zhang’s PCM-PUF paper, 
the capacitors would require a significant area in the IC. 
2.7.3 Security Performance Analysis of This Work 
A color map of the measured 85 cells was presented in section 2.4.3 in page 59 with very similar 
dimensions to show the randomness of programming to either 0 (HRS) or 1 (LRS). The measured 
cells were located at 5 dies (referred as die 1 to 5 in Figure 2-22). 
Total measured devices: 85 (excluding the 5 N/A devices). 
Number of cells programmed to 0 (HRS): 41 (48.2 %). 
Number of cells programmed to 1 (LRS): 44 (51.8 %). 
N/A refers to cells that were not used for this experiment.  
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Figure 2-22: A color map of the measured cells with very similar dimensions (widths of 100-130 
nm and lengths of ~420-440 nm) shows the randomness of programming to either 0 (HRS) or 1 
(LRS). 
An NIST 800-22 statistical test suite was run. For this test, a binary bit sequence was 
created taking the 0’s and 1’s as shown in the above map. The bits were taken in a row-by row 
fashion, i.e., first, all the bits in row 1 of Figure 2-22 were taken and then the bits from to row 2 
were taken, and so on. Then, the bit sequence was divided in 4 segments: each of 21 bits long. So, 
total 84 bits were used, and the last bit was discarded. All 4 sequences passed the frequency, block 
frequency, cumulative sums, and runs tests. The report on the test result is shown below:  
Table 2-2: NIST statistical test suite 800-22 results on the 85 measured data.  
C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9 C10    P-VALUE   PROPORTION  STATISTICAL TEST 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  0   2   0   0   0   1   0   0   1   0     ----       4/4       Frequency 
  0   2   0   0   0   1   0   0   1   0     ----       4/4       BlockFrequency 
  1   1   0   0   0   2   0   0   0   0     ----       4/4       CumulativeSums 
  0   2   1   0   0   0   0   1   0   0     ----       4/4       CumulativeSums 
  0   0   0   1   1   1   0   1   0   0     ----       4/4       Runs 
  4   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0     ----       0/4    *  LongestRun 
  4   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0     ----       0/4    *  Rank 
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To run this test completely, at least 1 million cells need to be measured, since the number 
of bits needed for the test corresponds to the number of measured/programmed cells in this case. 
Programming that large number of cells is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of an academic setting 
(with manual probe stations). At least, 100 bits are required even for a basic test and a minimum 
of 10 sequences are required to calculate the p-values. Hence, due to lack of enough bits, the p-
values were not achieved, and the test could not be completed. In this chapter, device-level results 
are provided, instead, for the proof-of-concept. 
2.7.4 Comparisons with Other Works 
Piccinini et al. shows an interesting simulation of crystallization variability in a PCM cell array 
with a random network model [97]. Based on the simulation results, they generated 300 sequences, 
each of 16-bit long. Their NIST 800-22 statistical test result was as follows: 
Table 2-3: NIST 800-22 statistical test results of Piccinini et al. [97]. 
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In this chapter, 4 sequences of bits received from the experimental results, each of 21 bits 
long, were generated. All sequences passed the frequency, block frequency, cumulative sums 
(forward and reverse), and the runs tests. However, all sequences failed in the longest runs and 
rank tests due to a lack of sufficient bits. Even though this data set is small, it shows actual 
measurements as compared to the simulation-based results in [97]. 
Table 2-4: NIST 800-22 statistical test results of the experimental data measured on 85 cells 
(shown in section 2.4.3 in page 59). 
Test Name Failure rate Result 
Frequency 0% Pass 
Block frequency 0% Pass 
Cumulative sums (forward) 0% Pass 
Cumulative sums (reverse) 0% Pass 
Runs 0% Pass 
LongestRun 100% Fail 
Rank 100% Fail 
Yu et al. presented a ring oscillator (RO) PUF, which requires error correction circuitry 
and thus consumes extra area overhead [98]. The results presented in this chapter (section 2.4.3) 
show very stable PUF responses, that are easily distinguishable; the reliability is further improved 
upon aging because of the resistance drift of these PCM cells (illustrated in Figure 2-8). Hence, an 
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error correction circuitry would not be required in this case. Moreover, reference [98] is based on 
a CMOS-based PUF, which only relies on process variations. Hence, it is worth investigating new 
non-volatile memory-based PUFs, in which the programming variability is an added useful feature 
and the cycle-to-cycle programming variability and high endurance can result in reconfigurable 
PUFs. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The unique structures formed during the melt-quench amorphization in PCM provide good cell-
to-cell and cycle-to-cycle variability for refreshable sets of challenge-response pairs for 
reconfigurable PUFs. The effects of cell dimensions and pulsing parameters on reset variability 
are experimentally characterized in GST-based PCM line cells for PUF applications. Cells with 
higher length-to-width ratio show higher reset variability when moderate amplitude single voltage 
pulses are applied with short pulse edges. Due to effective conduction blockage with single pulse 
amorphization, these cells also exhibit a wide separation between the low and high resistance 
states, avoiding the need for a reference cell array in a binary PUF. It has been shown that a random 
and equal probability of low and high resistance states can be achieved using a pre-calibrated 
programming amplitude. No bit flipping, and an even clearer distinction between the two states 
were observed after 9 months at room temperature. This reset PUF test was conducted on 85 cells 
of similar dimensions and large length-to-width ratio. The overall programming uncertainty in this 
work originates from the complex intrinsic phase change dynamics of GST, including the transient 
current overshoots during the pulse transients and the thermal runaway at the onset of melting. 
The evolutions of the cell voltage, current, temperature, and the phase distribution maps 
are evaluated by modeling the experimental circuitry in SPICE and performing finite element 
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simulations in COMSOL inputting the measured waveforms. It has been observed that the 
capacitive current overshoot, due to the parasitic capacitances present in the experimental setup, 
is significantly stronger for the short tedge case, which not only enables amorphization at a lower 
applied voltage amplitude, but also introduces added amorphization uncertainty because of the 
resulting faster rise and fall of the cell temperature during the transients. In addition to the 
capacitive overshoot, slight thermal runaway is also expected in the measured hcp GST cell at the 
onset of melting. The overall programming uncertainty in this work originates from the intrinsic 
phase change dynamics of GST, which is more significant for the long-narrow cells and the short 
pulse edges. In a more practical case, where the starting LRS is an fcc state, an enhancement of 
the overall programming variability and a further reduction of the required reset voltage amplitude 
is expected due to the thermal runaway of the fcc state, which is again an intrinsic property of GST. 
PCM line cells, such as used in this chapter, are useful for characterization studies, and 
show greater variability compared to confined designs such as mushroom or micro-trench cells but 
suffer from worse endurance and cell area. New cell designs are needed for optimal memory 
parameters and variability to reach overall suitable devices for a given hardware security 
application. PCM PUFs are not suitable for high-temperature operation due to accelerated 
crystallization (data loss) above ~ 105 °C [75]. Also, like most PUFs based on programming 
variability of emerging non-volatile memories, PCM PUFs are weak PUFs because of the limited 
number of CRPs (which can only increase linearly with the number of cells in the array). New 
concepts for designs of strong PUFs with exponentially large number of CRPs and inherent 
stochastic device properties are still of high interest. Nevertheless, PCM-PUFs are a promising 
platform for a wide range of applications in hardware security due to large intrinsic variability, 
high density, CMOS compatibility, and technology maturity.  
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Chapter 3 | Enhancing Programming Variability for 
Security Applications in Multi-bit PCM 
3.1 Abstract 
We performed gradual programming on phase change memory (PCM) line cells with repeated 
pulses and analyzed the variability in programming trends for various cell dimensions. The 
crystalline PCM cells experienced repeated applied voltage pulses of either identical amplitudes 
or gradually increasing amplitudes. When repeated identical pulses were applied on wide 
rectangular cells (width, W ~700 nm), a good agreement was observed in the programming trends 
from cell to cell. Conversely, the narrow rectangular and dog-bone cells (W ~260 and ~100 nm, 
respectively), experiencing identical pulses, resulted in unpredictable programming trends. The 
repeated voltage pulses with increasing amplitudes gradually amorphized all cells through several 
partial reset steps. Despite the same initial, final, and incremental voltage parameters inputted for 
a certain dimension, variations were observed in the gradual reset pace from cell to cell. These 
variations were, again, stronger for the narrow rectangular and dog-bone cells as compared to the 
wide rectangular cells. The enhanced cell-to-cell programming variability in the narrower cells 
resulted from stronger variations in: (i) manufacturing processes, (ii) initial crystalline resistance 
spreads due to stochastic grain maps and few grain boundaries, (iii) atomic arrangement after each 
full or gradual reset, (iv) spontaneous resistance drift and crystallization trends in the randomly 
evolved intermediate states between consecutive pulses, and (v) spatial distributions of voids 
formed due to quenching of the material from melt. The stronger variability observed in the gradual 
programming trends in the narrow line cells is promising for the hardware security applications.  
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3.2 Introduction 
Programming variability, due to uncontrolled manufacturer variations and stochastic physical 
processes inherent to the material properties or device operation principles, is a critical reliability 
problem for the emerging non-volatile memory (NVM) nanodevices. Phase change memory 
(PCM), one of these NVM technologies, exhibits both cell-to-cell and cycle-to-cycle programming 
variations [58], posing serious concerns for reliable operations in memory and storage 
applications. PCM is fast, dense, highly scalable, and technologically mature [99]. It relies on the 
contrast of resistance values between amorphous (high resistance state or HRS) and crystalline 
(low resistance state or LRS) phases of a chalcogenide material, most commonly Ge2Sb2Te5 or 
GST. The electrical switching (set and reset) operations in PCM are accomplished by applying 
appropriate voltage or current pulses. The set pulse raises the cell temperature above the glass 
transition temperature, but below the melting temperature, for a sufficiently long time. The reset 
pulse melts a portion of the cell followed by an abrupt quenching. Therefore, reset operation 
requires higher amplitude current or voltage pulse with shorter duration and sharper falling edge 
as compared to the set operation [47], [48]. Due to the intrinsic variability associated with both set 
and reset operations, the same programming pulse does not result in the exact same programmed 
resistance from cell to cell or from cycle to cycle of the same cell [58].  
Moreover, when the pulse parameters are in the mid-range of those used for a full set or 
full reset operation, an uncertainty in programming to the HRS or LRS arises [100]. These 
uncertain or variable programming characteristics are useful to build physical unclonable functions 
(PUFs), hardware devices used for cryptographic security applications, such as authentication, 
identification, and digital key generation [56], [57], [88]. Traditional microelectronic circuit based 
PUFs rely solely on the process variations of CMOS fabrication technology and are prone to 
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various kinds of physical and modelling attacks [6]. PUFs based on NVM nanodevices, such as 
PCM, on the other hand, are gaining growing attention in the hardware security field due to the 
added variations present at nanoscale and several other interesting properties [36], such as 
programming variability [58], spontaneous resistance drift [64], [65], [101] and crystallization 
[58], [63] and the associated stochasticity in the data loss trend [59], random telegraph signal noise 
[77], 1/f fluctuations [102], and so on. These device-level random features, problems for precise 
programming to the densely-spaced resistance levels for multilevel cell (MLC) memory [55] and 
synaptic devices [103], [104], are greatly appreciated for cryptographic security applications. 
In this chapter, the gradual phase change of GST line cells using repeated voltage pulses is 
presented, where partial amorphization, partial crystallization, resistance drift, and evolving grain 
distribution lead to stochastic programming trends. The variabilities observed in programming 
profiles are experimentally demonstrated, and the possible physical mechanisms behind the 
enhanced variability and the prospects of these features in hardware security applications are 
discussed in this chapter. 
3.3 Background Works and Contributions of This Work 
Repeated pulsing is a commonly used technique to precisely program to the intermediate states for 
MLC operation [55] and PCM-based synaptic devices [103], [104]. In this technique, intermediate 
states are reached by gradual increase and decrease of programmed cell resistance by means of 
partial reset and partial set operations, respectively. Owing to the uncontrolled phase change 
dynamics in PCM, the gradual programming is reported to be achieved in an iterative fashion, 
where a target intermediate resistance level (Rtarget) is assigned; and partial reset pulses are 
continuously applied on the crystalline cells until Rtarget is attained. If the programmed resistance 
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level (Rprogrammed) goes slightly higher than Rtarget, repeated partial set pulses are continuously 
applied to program the cell fairly close to Rtarget. In this way, several iterations of repeated partial 
reset and partial set pulses are applied to program within a pre-determined error margin around 
Rtarget [55]. For both MLC and synaptic device applications, a consistent trend in the programmed 
resistance profile is desired for reliable operation. For security applications, such as PUFs, on the 
other hand, an uncontrolled and stochastic pattern of the gradual programming profile is useful. 
Zhang et al. demonstrated PCM-based PUF with gradual programming scheme, which thwarts the 
physical attack by refresh operations performed either in a certain period or after a certain number 
of challenge response pairs (CRPs) are measured [32] (as described in 1.3.3.3 in page 36). The 
complete implementation, security performance analyses, and the resilience toward physical 
attacks are valuable contributions of reference [32]. However, no device-level measurements of 
the stochastic programming patterns have been presented in reference [32]. Hence, further 
understanding of the key contributing factors for programming variability and possible ways to 
enhance this variability are essential measures toward the improvement of the PCM-based 
hardware security field. Moreover, in reference [32], the responses are determined based on the 
random number of pulses required to amorphize a cell and can potentially be revealed with side 
channel attacks from the knowledge of pulsing time and energy. In this chapter, an alternative 
algorithm is proposed to determine the responses with a fixed number of applied pulses to all cells. 
The random programmed resistance values on different cells have been quantized to multiple states 
based on pre-defined threshold resistance levels (Figure 3-1). 
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Figure 3-1: Determination of responses based on the programmed resistance, Rprogrammed and pre-
defined threshold resistance levels (for example, Rth1, Rth2, and Rth3). 
In Chapter 2 (section 2.5), it has been shown that the parasitic components present in the 
experimental setup and the thermal runaway of GST greatly enhance programming variability in 
a binary PCM-PUF based on stochastic reset using single applied voltage pulse [100]. In this 
chapter, it has also been shown how these factors influence the programming profile. The more 
complex resistance drift and crystallization dynamics and the complicated programming 
characteristics from the gradually evolved intermediate states are discussed based on the 
experimental observations. 
3.4 Devices and Experimental Setup 
50 nm thick GST line cells with length, L of ~ 460 nm and widths, W of ~ 700 nm (wide 
rectangular), ~260 nm (narrow rectangular), and, ~100 nm (narrow dog-bone-shaped) are 
electrically characterized (scanning electron microscope or SEM images shown in Figure 3-2a-c). 
The cells had bottom metal contact pads and were capped with Si3N4 [65]. These cells were 
annealed at 675 K for 10 minutes in a Janis probe station to crystallize the as-deposited cells into 
the stable hexagonal close packed (hcp) phase (annealing profile shown in Figure 3-2d). Electrical 
voltage pulses of 200 ns duration were applied to these hcp cells using a Tektronix arbitrary 
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function generator AFG 3102. The applied voltage and resulting current waveforms were 
measured using a Tektronix digital phosphor oscilloscope DPO 4104 (electrical setup shown in 
Figure 3-2e). Low voltage DC sweep read operations with -0.1 to +0.1 V were performed before 
and after each applied pulse (Figure 3-2f,g) using an Agilent semiconductor parameter analyzer 
4156C. An Arduino Mega 2560 card connected to a computer was used to control a relay card that 
switched between the pulsing and reading operations automatically (Figure 3-2e). 
 
Figure 3-2: SEM images of (a) wide rectangular (W: ~700 nm, L: ~460 nm), (b) narrow rectangular 
(W: ~260 nm, L: ~460 nm), and (c) narrow dog-bone-shaped (W: ~100 nm, L: ~460 nm) GST line 
cells. (d) Annealing at 675 K for 10 minutes to reach the stable hcp state. (e) Electrical 
measurement setup. Electrical measurement sequence of pulsing with (f) repeated identical 
amplitudes and (g) gradually increasing amplitudes. Low voltage read operations were performed 
in between applied pulses for both cases.  
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Cells were electrically characterized with two types of repeated pulsing schemes (shown 
in Figure 3-2f,g). In the first scheme, repeated voltage pulses of identical amplitudes (Videntical) 
were applied on all three cell dimensions (Figure 3-2f). For each cell dimension, moderate Videntical 
values were chosen, that were sufficient to initiate resistance change but not high enough to 
amorphize the cells completely with a single pulse. The effect of different Videntical values was 
tested on all cell types. The extent of variability observed in the programming trends was 
monitored when a given Videntical was repeatedly applied on various cells of each dimension. In the 
next scheme, repeated pulses of gradually increasing amplitudes were applied on all three cell 
types (Figure 3-2g). The same starting and ending voltage amplitudes (Vstart and Vend) were used 
for a certain cell dimension. It was observed how different increments in amplitudes of consecutive 
applied voltage pulses (Vstep) affect the programming trend. The span of variability was also 
observed by using a given Vstep on different cells of each dimension. 
3.5 Results & Discussion 
3.5.1 Repeated Identical Pulses 
For each cell dimension, first, the effect of various Videntical was monitored on different cells (Figure 
3-3a-c) and then the variability in the programmed resistance (Rprogrammed) trend was observed by 
applying a given Videntical on different cells (Figure 3-3d-f). Videntical of 2.8, 2.9, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 
3.4 V were applied on 6 individual wide rectangular cells (W: ~700 nm, L: ~460 nm). These pulses 
resulted in a sudden, sharp increase of resistance due to partial reset during the first 3-4 pulses and 
then a gradual resistance trimming followed due to precise partial set over the next few hundreds 
of applied pulses (Figure 3-3a). The transition from partial reset to partial set occurring at the 3rd 
or 4th pulse can be ascribed to the monotonous Videntical, which became insufficient to continue the 
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partial reset at the elevated resistance levels. After applying 100-400 identical pulses, resistance 
trimming saturated (at ~4-20 kΩ on different cells) and instead, a precise resistance increase took 
place. In some cases, the gradual resistance trimming and increase took turns a few times (for 
instance, for 3.3 V in Figure 3-3a), which can be related to the equal probability of partial reset or 
partial set, because of the moderate Videntical. Higher Videntical elevated the programed resistance 
levels (Rprogrammed) with similar resistance evolutions. For a Videntical of 3.4 V, a stronger reset took 
place on the 4th applied pulse with Rprogrammed > 107 Ω. The upward resistance drift at this 
amorphous phase eventually dominated over the brief gradual resistance trimming effect. 
To study the variability of Rprogrammed evolution on the wide cells, Videntical of 3.2 V was 
applied on 5 wide rectangular cells. Slightly different maximum resistance values (varying from 
21 kΩ to 147 kΩ and obtained on the 4th or 5th pulse) and slightly different Rprogrammed evolutions 
were observed (Figure 3-3d). This slight variation can be attributed to the combined effect of the 
reset and set variability associated with each applied pulse and the variability in spontaneous 
resistance drift taking place in between the consecutive pulses. The overall Rprogrammed evolution 
was still predictable with very small degree of variability for all wide rectangular cells. 
On the other hand, the narrow rectangular cells (W: ~260 nm, L: ~460 nm) showed 
significant variability on the Rprogrammed evolutions, possibly due to amplified process variations, 
stronger programming sensitivity, and resistance drift variations as compared to those for the wide 
rectangular cells. These cells demonstrated a higher tendency to amorphize to the high resistance 
state above ~107 Ω at an uncertain number of applied pulse and at this amorphous phase, the 
upward resistance drift dominated over the pulsing effects. The tendency of amorphizing 
drastically to the amorphous phase without going through several intermediate states can be 
attributed to the easier conduction blockage property of a narrow cell as compared to the 
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percolation-oriented conduction in a wide cell [100]. 7 narrow rectangular cells experienced 
Videntical of 1.8, 1.9, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 V and the resulting Rprogrammed evolutions showed no 
predictive pattern or dependence on Videntical (Figure 3-3b). Whereas Videntical of 1.8 V amorphized 
one cell after 27 applied pulses to ~42 MΩ, Videntical of 2.3 V could not raise the resistance of 
another cell above 10 kΩ with 317 applied pulses.  
 
Figure 3-3: Measured cell resistance as a function of the applied pulse numbers while 
programming with 200 ns duration repeated identical amplitude pulses on (a, d) wide rectangular 
(W: ~700 nm, L: ~460 nm), (b, e) narrow rectangular (W: ~260 nm, L: ~460 nm), and (c, f) narrow 
dog-bone (W: ~100 nm, L: ~460 nm) GST line cells. The identical pulse amplitudes (Videntical) in 
each case are as indicated in the legends.  
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The reason behind the lack of a predictable trend was clearer when the same Videntical of 2.2 
V was applied on 6 other narrow rectangular cells and very random Rprogrammed evolutions were 
observed (Figure 3-3e). This indicates that the programming variability in these cells is so large 
that the effect of different Videntical values is barely noticeable. The narrow dog-bone-shaped cells 
(W: ~100 nm, L: ~460 nm) also showed similar uncertainty in Rprogrammed evolutions and similar 
tendency of amorphizing above 107 Ω at an uncertain number of applied pulses (Figure 3-3e,f). 
These chaotic trends observed in the Rprogrammed evolutions for both types of narrow cells (Figure 
3-3b,c,e,f) show promise to the PUF applications. 
However, the very chaotic programming trends of this approach might not always result in 
an equal distribution of all states in an array of cells after a certain number of applied pulses, which 
is an essential metric for PUFs. Instead, a less chaotic but still unpredictable programming scheme 
presented next can build PUFs with less power requirement, less programming time, and more 
equal state distributions, i.e. improved PUF uniqueness. 
3.5.2 Repeated Pulsing with Increasing Amplitude 
Whereas the identical pulse amplitudes were found to gradually program the cells randomly in the 
partial reset and partial set regimes, the gradually increasing amplitude pulses were ideally 
expected to only program in the partial reset regime monotonously. Literature shows experimental 
[105] and simulation-based [32] results from micro-trench PCM cells, where smaller Vstep resulted 
in smoother and slower resistance increase through finer partial reset. However, the measurements 
with gradually increasing amplitudes on the stand-alone GST line cells in this section showed 
erratic sudden amorphization in the gradual reset process, due to the additional capacitive current 
originating from the parasitic components in the experimental setup. Moreover, the significant 
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thermal runaway at the amorphized volumes and the face-centered cubic or fcc crystalline regions 
randomly located along the line cells in the evolved intermediate states can also contribute to this 
enhanced programming variability [100]. 
 
Figure 3-4: Measured cell resistance as a function of the applied pulse amplitudes while 
programming with 200 ns duration, gradually increasing amplitude pulses on (a, d) wide 
rectangular (W: ~700 nm, L: ~460 nm, Vstart = 2 V, Vend = 7 V), (b, e) narrow rectangular (W: ~260 
nm, L: ~460 nm, Vstart = 1.8 V, Vend ≤ 2.6 V), and (c, f) narrow dog-bone (W: ~100 nm, L: ~460 
nm, Vstart = 1.2 V, Vend ≥ 1.5 V) GST line cells. The step increment in amplitude in between 
consecutive iterations (Vstep) in each case is indicated in the legend. 
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For the wide rectangular cells, Vstart of 2 V and Vend of 7 V were used, and Vstep of 0.01, 
0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, and 1 V were applied. The larger Vstep programmed the wide rectangular cell 
more drastically as compared to the smaller Vstep inputs (Figure 3-4a). The cell was programmed 
to ~2 kΩ, ~8 kΩ, ~227 kΩ, and 17 MΩ with the largest Vstep of 1 V but many intermediate 
resistance levels were more easily reachable with the smaller Vstep inputs. Moreover, the cell 
eventually broke at the last step of the largest Vstep case, due to excess void formation during the 
recurrent abrupt reset processes, which was not observed in the smaller Vstep cases. Smaller Vstep 
cases incorporated some slight partial set operations on some steps but the overall programming 
was still in the gradual reset direction (Figure 3-4a). To test the variability in the programming 
trends with this pulsing scheme on these wide cells, the same Vstart of 2 V, Vend of 7 V, and Vstep of 
0.2 V were applied on 20 wide rectangular cells, and very little spread was observed (Figure 3-4d). 
For the narrow rectangular and dog-bone cells, on the other hand, no trend was observed 
when different Vstep values were applied (Figure 3-4b,c) and the underlying cause was even clearer 
when the same Vstep values were applied on 20 cells of each dimension and very broad spread was 
observed in the programming trends (Figure 3-4c,f). 
The statistics of the progressive Rprogrammed values on these 20 cells of each dimension was 
quantitively measured and shown in Figure 3-5. At first, the minimum and maximum of the 
Rprogrammed values after each applied pulse were illustrated with the symbol ✳ at the first row of 
Figure 3-5 a-c. The average Rprogrammed values after each applied pulse were plotted with the symbol 
★ in Figure 3-5a-c. The box chart in Figure 3-5a-c represents the 25th to 75th percentile of the 20 
measured Rprogrammed values after each applied pulse.  
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Figure 3-5: Statistical analysis on the programming variability observed in Figure 3-4d-f. (a-c) The 
minimum and maximum programmed resistance values measured after each applied pulse are 
plotted with ✳, the average is plotted as ★, the box chart represents the 25th to 75th percentile of 
the 20 data points, and the raw data points are plotted as the small scattered ◇. (d-f) Coefficient of 
variation (CV) as a function of applied pulse amplitudes. The areas with higher CV (> 1) are 
highlighted with green boxes. (g-i) Distribution of different states in a 2-bit per cell scheme, i.e. 
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4-level programming scheme for the 20 cells of each dimension. The arrows in (h) and (i) indicate 
equal distribution of the 4 programmed states 00, 01, 10, and 11, an essential PUF feature. 
Then, the coefficient of variation (CV) for the 20 Rprogrammed values after each applied pulse 
were calculated (Figure 3-5d-f). CV is also known as the relative standard deviation and is the 
ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. A CV value over 1 represents high variability, whereas 
below 1 indicates low variability. For the wide rectangular cells, CV > 1 was only obtained for the 
Rprogrammed values after applying 3.1 and 3.2 V amplitude pulses (Figure 3-5d). On the other hand, 
CV > 1 was found for the Rprogrammed values measured after the 17 consecutive pulses from 1.95 to 
2.35 V amplitudes for 260 nm rectangular narrow cells (Figure 3-5e). For the 100 nm narrow dog-
bone cells, CV > 1 was found after applying almost all pulse amplitudes (Figure 3-5f). 
These high variability regions of CV > 1 are highlighted with green boxes in Figure 3-5a-
f and it is evident that the Rprogrammed variability increases as the cell width decreases. The broad 
spread of Rprogrammed values in the narrow rectangular and narrow dog-bone cells show promising 
opportunity for multi-bit PUFs. The cell-to-cell randomness in Rprogrammed attained after a certain 
number of applied pulses due to the varying pace of gradual programming with this pulsing scheme 
can produce distinctly different responses to the same challenge on different cells, which can be 
utilized to implement a multi-level PUF. Threshold resistances (Rth) were defined for 
distinguishing the quantized levels in a 2-bit, i.e. 4-level PUF design. Rth values for the three cell 
types between the distinct quantized states 00, 01, 10, and 11 are listed in Table 3-1. These Rth 
values are chosen individually for the three different cell dimensions to ensure the best achievable 
equal distribution of different states. These state distribution maps are plotted in Figure 3-5g-i. 
The less variable programming trend in the wide rectangular cells is evident from the state 
distribution map in Figure 3-5g, which indicates comparatively similar progression of partial reset 
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operations in the 20 cells. On the other hand, the large programming variability is clear from the 
state distribution maps shown in Figure 3-5h,i, where the occurrence of various states is observed 
after a certain amplitude of applied pulses. The arrows shown in Figure 3-5h,i indicate the pulse 
amplitudes for which equal distribution of the 4 states are obtained. 
Table 3-1: Threshold resistance values (Rthreshold) used to distinguish states 00, 01, 10, and 11.  
Cell type W (nm) Rthreshold(00-01) (Ω) Rthreshold(01-10) (Ω) Rthreshold(10-11) (Ω) 
Wide rectangular 700 4000 800,000 20,000,000 
Narrow rectangular 260 3850 8000 100,000 
Narrow dog-bone 100 2400 7,000 130,000 
It is important to note that the state distributions can be tuned by changing the Rth values 
for each cell dimension. Moreover, Rth values need to be calibrated for each cell dimension. 
Another important point is that the spontaneous resistance drift evolving from different states in a 
multi-bit PUF can often mix different states, which is a major concern for MLC operation, too. 
Established solutions, such as cell-state metric can be adopted, in which different read voltages are 
used for reading different cell resistances and thus the measured resistance evolution over time 
becomes unaffected without any concern for mixing of states [106]. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The variations in programming trends was studied for different dimensions of Ge2Sb2Te5 phase 
change memory line cells by applying repeated pulses of identical and gradually increasing 
amplitudes. When the repeated pulses with identical amplitudes were applied, the wide cells 
99 
 
produced similar resistance trends with moderate degree of variability, whereas the narrow cells 
showed unpredictable resistance trends, showing opportunity for the PUF applications. 
Considering the large number of applied pulses and the lengthy programming time, the repeated 
pulses with gradually increasing amplitudes were preferred for a more practical PUF application. 
For the second pulsing scheme, a gradual reset is achieved on different cells with slightly varying 
programming pace in the wide cells and with a much stronger variability in the narrow cells. This 
varying programming pace in narrow cells with the gradually increasing amplitude pulsing 
approach provides possibility of multi-bit PUF implementation with distinct resistance levels.  
The overall enhanced variability observed in both programming schemes with any cell 
dimension can be ascribed to the additional capacitive currents originating from the parasitic 
components present in the experimental setup, such as the load resistance and the capacitances 
involved in the connectors and the thermal runaway present in the fcc and amorphous phases of 
GST. These parasitic components can be integrated in the PUF chip. The larger variations observed 
in the pace of gradual reset process in the narrow rectangular and dog-bone cells as compared to 
the wide rectangular ones can be attributed to the larger:  
1. process variations (cell geometry, i.e. length, width, and thickness),  
2. initial crystalline resistance variations [37], [38] due to grain distribution variations [89],  
3. intrinsic reset variability due to the random locations and sizes of the amorphized volumes 
in line cells [81], [107] and also due to the random atomic configuration in the amorphized 
volumes [58], and 
4. variable resistance drift appearing at the randomly evolved intermediate states in between 
consecutive pulses [63], [64], [101]. 
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Chapter 4 | Amorphized Length and Variability in 
PCM 
4.1 Abstract 
The dimensions of amorphized regions in phase-change memories are critical parameters to design 
devices for different applications but are difficult to determine by direct imaging. In this chapter, 
the length of amorphized regions in multiple, identical Ge2Sb2Te5 (GST) line cells was extracted 
from electrical measurements. After each cell was programmed to an amorphous state, a sequence 
of increasing amplitude post-reset voltage pulses separated by low-amplitude read DC-sweeps was 
applied. When a sufficient amplitude post-reset voltage pulse was applied to a given cell, the 
measured current and the post-pulse resistance increased drastically, indicating the cell re-
amorphized after threshold switching, melting, and quenching. The amorphized length was 
calculated using the measured voltage at which threshold switching took place and the expected 
drifted threshold field at that time. The measured threshold voltages, hence, the extracted 
amorphized lengths, generally increase linearly with the programmed resistance levels, but 
significant variability arises from the intrinsic uniqueness in the crystallization and amorphization 
processes in these devices. For example, cells programmed to ~50 MΩ amorphous resistance show 
threshold voltages of ~5-7 V, corresponding to amorphized lengths of ~240-360 nm. This 
unpredictable programming feature in phase-change memory devices can be utilized in hardware 
security applications. 
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4.2 Introduction 
Phase change memory (PCM) is an emerging non-volatile memory technology with high 
endurance, high speed, and good scalability. PCM relies on the change in phase of a nano-scale 
volume of a chalcogenide material sandwiched between two electrodes. The phase of the material 
can be switched between the high resistivity (amorphous or reset) and the low resistivity 
(crystalline or set) states by appropriate electrical pulses. The amorphization or reset process in 
PCM is achieved with a short and abrupt electrical pulse which melt-quenches the active region 
[47]. Nanoscale PCM devices exhibit significant cell-to-cell and cycle-to-cycle programming 
variability due to the intrinsic randomness in the crystallization and amorphization processes, in 
addition to any fabrication process variations. This probabilistic programming feature in PCM is 
recently being considered for several applications in hardware security, such as physical 
unclonable functions or true random number generators [32], [56], [57], [88], [100]. It is critical 
to characterize the physical factors contributing to the observed variability for conclusive 
understanding and proper utilization of this feature for these hardware security primitives. An 
essential physical parameter contributing to the programming variability is the random location 
and dimensions of different phases formed in the cell. The amorphous and crystalline regions in 
PCM devices can be distinguished by transmission electron microscopy (TEM) imaging [108], but 
this is a difficult and time-consuming process, and the sample preparation and imaging processes 
themselves may disturb the state of the material [109], [110]. Hence, TEM becomes impractical 
for variability analysis using a large number of devices. 
In this study, the lengths of the amorphized regions during reset are calculated using 
electrical measurements on twenty-five Ge2Sb2Te5 (GST-225) PCM line cells of very similar 
dimensions. The crystalline PCM line cells were first amorphized with a reset pulse. Then a 
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sequence of post-reset pulses was applied, with gradually increasing amplitudes. The cells were 
read after each pulse. When the applied post-reset pulse amplitude was high enough, a significant 
increase in the measured current and post-pulse cell resistance was observed, indicating re-
amorphization after threshold switching, melting, and subsequent quenching, as inferred from the 
measurements and SPICE circuit simulation results. The measured threshold voltage, and the 
drifted threshold field at that time are used to extract the amorphized length (Figure 4-1). 
 
Figure 4-1: Schematic procedure used in this chapter for extraction of amorphized length in phase-
change line cells. 
4.3 Threshold Switching in PCM 
Threshold switching is defined by a sudden and reversible physical process in amorphous 
chalcogenides that accompanies a sharp decrease in resistance. Various models were presented in 
the 1970s to explain the threshold switching process; some of these models indicated pure thermal 
effects [111], some referred to pure electrical effects [112], and others pointed to a combination of 
both [113]. The argument was settled for decades with the dominance of the electrical model but 
then re-ignited in the last decade by the difficulties in understanding threshold switching in 
nanoscale PCM cells. Among the several new explanations based on electrical [114]–[118] and 
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thermally assisted [119] effects, the electrical models are again prevailing, even though the specific 
mechanisms are expected to depend on the device geometry and dimensions [119]. According to 
the current understanding, threshold switching is initiated by electrical breakdown due to impact 
ionization, a purely electrical effect. The following sharp increase in current is ascribed to thermal 
runaway, i.e. the decrease in resistivity with increasing temperature that leads to further heating 
[117]. In this chapter, this model is used to interpret the measurement results. 
Krebs et al. measured the threshold field of 56 V/µm for as-deposited GST amorphous 
bridge cells by measuring the threshold voltages of various known dimensions and concluded that 
threshold field is a material-dependent physical parameter, whereas, the specific threshold voltage 
depends on the device geometry [117]. As-deposited amorphous cells of known dimensions were 
used in Krebs’ measurements, instead of the melt-quenched ones, to avoid the difficulty in 
determining the dimensions of the amorphized regions, but the drift time since deposition, which 
is a critical parameter, is difficult to extract. Since threshold voltage, Vthreshold (t) drifts upward in 
time [120], an effective threshold field, Ethreshold (t) is also expected to drift similarly, while the 
amorphized length, Lamorphized is expected to remain the same over time, despite structural 
relaxation [121] or other physical processes that may occur in the amorphous volume below the 
glass transition: 
 𝐸௧௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ(𝑡) =
𝑉௧௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ(𝑡)
𝐿௔௠௢௥௣௛௜௭௘ௗ
 (4-1) 
Lankhorst et al. measured a threshold field of 30-40 V/µm from melt-quenched GST 
devices at ~100 ns after amorphization [122]. Based on the known elapsed time after 
amorphization, t0 and the threshold field at t0, Ethreshold (t0), it is possible to extract the threshold 
field Ethreshold (t) at the elapsed time between amorphization and the time when Vthreshold (t) was 
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measured, t using the logarithmic trend of threshold voltage drift and the room temperature 
threshold voltage drift co-efficient, γ of 0.02 reported by Karpov et al. [120]: 
 
𝑉௧௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ(𝑡) − 𝑉௧௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ(𝑡଴)
𝑉௧௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ(𝑡଴)
= 𝛾𝑙𝑛 ൬
𝑡
𝑡଴
൰ (4-2) 
 
𝐸௧௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ(𝑡) − 𝐸௧௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ(𝑡଴)
𝐸௧௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ(𝑡଴)
= 𝛾𝑙𝑛 ൬
𝑡
𝑡଴
൰ (4-3) 
In this chapter, Ethreshold (t0) of 35±5 V/µm, calculated by Lankhorst et al. at t0 ~ 100 ns 
after amorphization for melt-quenched amorphous line cells, is used to obtain Ethreshold (t) at 
different measured times t, on different cells programmed to similar amorphous resistance using 
equation (4-3) and γ of 0.02, to then calculate Lamorphized and discuss the associated variability [107]. 
It is important to note that the term ‘electrical breakdown’ here refers to the reversible threshold 
switching process observed in these materials and not to the permanent and detrimental electrical 
breakdown failure that occurs in any dielectric. 
4.4 Methods 
The GST-225 line cells used for this study were on silicon dioxide (SiO2), had bottom metal 
contact pads (tungsten with Ti/TiN liner), and were capped by silicon nitride [67]. All cells were 
~130 nm in width, WGST, ~470 nm in length between the metal contacts, LGST, and ~50 nm in 
thickness, tGST (example scanning electron microscopy or SEM image in inset, Figure 4-2a). The 
as-fabricated cells were annealed in a Janis ST-500-UHT probe station at a pressure of ~1 mTorr 
at 675 K for 10 minutes to reach the stable hexagonal close packed or hcp crystalline phase 
(annealing profile shown in Figure 4-2a). The electrical measurements were performed after 
cooling to room temperature. Electrical pulses, generated by an arbitrary function generator 
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(Tektronix AFG 3102), were applied to the cells; a series load resistor of 5.1 kΩ was used to limit 
the current. The experimental circuit schematic is shown in Figure 4-2b. The experimental circuit 
was terminated through a digital oscilloscope (Tektronix DPO 4104) using two termination 
resistors of 50 Ω connected to channel 3 and 4. The applied voltage was monitored with Channel 
1 of the oscilloscope and the voltage across the parallel combination of two 50 Ω resistors was 
monitored with channel 3 and 4 to determine the current through the cell. A semiconductor 
parameter analyzer (Agilent 4156C) was used for low-voltage read operations with a DC voltage 
sweep between −0.1 to +0.1 V for all resistance levels. A relay circuit, controlled by an Arduino 
Mega 2560 card, was used to switch between the reading and programming sequences of the 
measurements. 
 
Figure 4-2: (a) Temperature ramp used for annealing as-fabricated amorphous devices to hcp 
phase, with a constant 675 K for the last 10 minutes. Inset shows the SEM image of an untested 
annealed GST line cell, with metal-to-metal LGST ~470 nm, WGST ~130 nm, and tGST ~50 nm. (b) 
Electrical measurement setup. 
Twenty-five identical hcp line cells with similar initial crystalline resistance values 
(Rcrystalline) were amorphized to similar programmed resistance level (Rprogrammed) of ~107 Ω with a 
comparatively narrow distribution, so that the variations in initial Rprogrammed do not greatly affect 
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the extraction of Lamorphized. Table 4-1 shows the statistical distributions of the Rcrystalline and 
Rprogrammed values for the 25 measured GST cells. Due to intrinsic variability and process variations 
observed from cell to cell, the number(s) and the amplitude(s) of the applied voltage pulses to 
reach Rprogrammed of ~107 Ω varied slightly [57], [100]. The applied voltage amplitude required for 
this “initial reset” varied between ~2 and ~2.5 V whereas the number of pulses varied between 1 
and 10. All amorphization voltage pulses were rectangular with a duration tduration of ~200 ns and 
rise and fall times trise = tfall of ~25 ns. Once the cells reached this initial reset condition, a sequence 
of rectangular “post-reset pulses”, with gradually increasing amplitudes (0.4 V to 10 V with a 0.1 
V increment), and same tduration, trise, and tfall as used in the initial reset step, were applied. Low-
voltage DC sweep read operations were performed before and after each applied pulse. Figure 4-3 
shows the schematic of the measurement sequences. 
Table 4-1: Statistical Distribution of Cell Resistance: Minimum, maximum, and median of the 
crystalline and programmed resistance values (Rcrystalline and Rprogrammed) of the 25 measured GST 
cells (LGST ~470 nm, WGST ~130 nm, and tGST ~50 nm). 
Cell resistance Minimum resistance Maximum resistance Median 
Rcrystalline 267 Ω 3162 Ω 522 Ω 
Rprogrammed 8 MΩ 65 MΩ 28 MΩ 
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Figure 4-3: Measurement sequence. One or more pulses were applied to initially reset the hcp cells. 
Then a sequence of pulses with increasing amplitude (from 0.4 to 10 V in 0.1 V increment) were 
applied until further re-amorphization and eventually physical breaking occurred with loss of 
electrical connection. Low voltage read operations were performed before and after each applied 
pulse. 
4.5 Results 
The amorphized devices showed the expected steady upward resistance drift right after being 
initially reset [64], [65]. The monotonous drift continued until a sufficient Vpost-reset was applied, 
when a significantly higher amplitude current was measured during the pulse and a drastic increase 
in Rprogrammed was observed after the pulse. These results indicate that threshold switching took 
place and thermal runaway of the amorphous state was initiated by the parasitic capacitive spike 
that followed. A SPICE simulation was performed to extract the cell voltage and current (Vcell and 
Icell) by inputting the measured voltage waveforms at channel 1 (Vch1) and channel 3,4 (Vch3,4) as 
voltage sources. The extracted high amplitude and sharp rising edge of Icell would cause melting 
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of the material [123]; and the abrupt decrease of Icell due to the discharge of parasitic capacitance, 
would quench the cells quickly [124] resulting in re-amorphization (see section 4.6 in page 114). 
An example of the re-amorphization procedure on an initially amorphized cell is shown in 
Figure 4-4a with Rprogrammed plotted as a function of Vpost-reset. This cell was initially amorphized at 
7.5 MΩ, with a certain amorphized length Lamorphized(1). A schematic of the possible phase 
distribution in the cell after the initial reset is shown in Figure 4-5a. The amorphous cell started to 
show the usual upward resistance drift, which was unaffected by the early lower Vpost-reset pulses. 
After a Vpost-reset of 1.9 V was applied, Rprogrammed drastically increased from the drifted amorphous 
resistance value of 10.55 MΩ to 48.05 MΩ (Figure 4-4a). The measured current through the 
channel 3 and 4 termination resistors showed a sudden overshoot (with a peak of ~0.46 mA, green 
solid line, Figure 4-4b). This current amplitude was significantly higher than the barely noticeable 
current that flew through these termination resistors for all the lower Vpost-reset amplitudes. An 
example recorded current waveform through the channel 3 and 4 termination resistors for Vpost-reset 
of 1 V is plotted in Figure 4-4b (blue dotted line) to show the difference. Even though all 
waveforms were monitored, only a few were recorded to avoid adding extra elapsed time between 
amorphization and threshold switching. The 1.9 V amplitude pulse caused a threshold switching, 
by means of the electrical breakdown of the already-existing insulating amorphous region of length 
Lamorphized(1). Therefore, 1.9 V is the threshold voltage Vthreshold(1) for the breakdown of length 
Lamorphized(1). The increased amorphous resistance indicates a larger effective length of the new 
amorphous region Lamorphized(2) (Figure 4-5b), even though any voids formed would also alter the 
overall cell resistance. The cell again started to drift upward and stayed unaffected by the next few 
post-reset pulses until the next threshold switching event at Vthreshold(2) of 8.2 V, of the amorphized 
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region of length Lamorphized(2). At this point, the wire itself broke physically, and electrical 
connection was lost, possibly due to void formation in the middle of the cell (Figure 4-5c). 
 
Figure 4-4: Repeated post-reset pulses of 200 ns duration and 0.4 to 10 V amplitudes (with an 
increment of 0.1 V) applied to an amorphous cell with LGST of ~470 nm, WGST of ~130 nm, and 
tGST of ~50 nm, and initially programmed to ~7.5 MΩ. (a) Evolution of Rprogrammed as a function of 
post-reset pulse amplitude (Vpost-reset). (b) Example waveforms of applied voltage and current 
through termination resistors during an unsuccessful (blue dotted line) re-amorphization, a 
successful (green solid line) re-amorphization, and a breaking episode when electrical connections 
are lost (red solid line). The voltage and current waveforms for the Vpost-reset of 1.9 and 8.2 V are 
inputted in the SPICE simulations and the resulting cell voltage and current Vcell and Icell are 
extracted by modeling the experimental setup circuitry (section 4.6 in page 114). 
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Figure 4-5: Schematic illustration of the calculation of amorphized length for the two post-reset 
re-amorphization episodes shown in Figure 4-4: (a) after initial reset, (b) after first re-
amorphization at Vthreshold(1) of 1.9 V, (c) after second re-amorphization and physical breaking with 
loss of electrical connection at Vthreshold(2) of 8.2 V. Threshold voltages indicate the voltage at which 
the already existing amorphous region experienced electrical breakdown during threshold 
switching.  
We repeated this re-amorphization study on 25 cells and measured Vthreshold (t) values, 
which was plotted against the programmed resistance values measured at 10 s after amorphization 
(Rprogrammed (10 s)) in Figure 4-6a. Cells with higher Rprogrammed (17 out of 25 cells) physically broke 
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after the first amorphization (i.e. initial reset) without any intermediate re-amorphization episode 
and are plotted as spheres in Figure 4-6a. The loss of electrical connection in the wire was 
confirmed by post-pulse DC I-V characteristics and SEM imaging performed after the electrical 
characterization (Figure 4-6b). Cells that experienced one or more re-amorphization episode(s) are 
plotted as stars connected with dotted lines in Figure 4-6a. The extrapolated Ethreshold (t) (Figure 
4-7a) and measured Vthreshold (t) (Figure 4-7b), both at a certain time t, which is different for 
different measured cells, are used to calculate Lamorphized (Figure 4-7c) using equation (4-1). Since 
Lamorphized remains the same for a given amorphized region, it is only important to consistently 
extrapolate Ethreshold (t) at the time t when Vthreshold (t) is measured. 
 
Figure 4-6: Vthreshold (left Y) and estimated Lamorphized (right Y) for 25 identical cells as a function 
of Rprogrammed. The data-points for different cells are plotted with different colors. Cells that 
demonstrated multiple re-amorphization events are plotted with stars connected with dotted lines 
(8 out of 25 cells) and the ones experiencing single re-amorphization event are plotted with spheres 
(17 out of 25 cells). 
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Figure 4-7: Logarithmic upward drift of threshold field Ethreshold (t) [120] and the associated error 
from the reported value [122] as a function of elapsed time after amorphization t. (b) Measured 
threshold voltage Vthreshold (t) as a function of the measured Rprogrammed, (c) calculated Lamorphized with 
the error propagated from the reported Ethreshold (t0) as a function of the measured Rprogrammed, and 
(d) calculated ρamorphous (10 s) with the error propagated from the reported Ethreshold (t0) as a function 
of the measured Rprogrammed. 
We observed a linear relation between the measured Vthreshold (t) and Rprogrammed (Figure 4-6 
and Figure 4-7b), which in turn is linearly related with the calculated Lamorphized with a moderate 
degree of variability (Figure 4-7c). The error in the reported Ethreshold (t0) of ±5 V/µm is propagated 
in the extrapolated Ethreshold (t) and the calculated Lamorphized, plotted as the gray error bars in Figure 
4-7, using the standard methods of propagation of uncertainties [125]. In addition to this 
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variability, there was also cell-to-cell variability in the measured Vthreshold (t) value for a certain 
Rprogrammed (Figure 4-6a) and this cell-to-cell variability is also propagated to the zero-intercept 
fitted expression for Lamorphized:  
 𝑉௧௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ = 𝑅௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௠௘ௗ × (1.29 ± 0.04) 
𝑉
10 𝑀𝛺
 (4-4) 
 𝐿௔௠௢௥௣௛௜௭௘ௗ = 𝑅௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௠௘ௗ × (60.82 ± 2.11) 
𝑛𝑚
10 𝑀𝛺
 (4-5) 
Equations (4-4) and (4-5) show that for an amorphous region programmed to 10 MΩ, a 
Vthreshold of 1.29 ± 0.04 V is required for threshold switching, indicating an Lamorphized of 61.32 ± 
2.13 nm. Besides process variations, these variations observed in Vthreshold (t) and Lamorphized can be 
ascribed to: 
 variations in the initial Rcrystalline values (shown in Table 4-1 for the 25 measured cells), due 
to the random arrangement of grains in the cells [37], [38], [89],  
 variations in shape of the amorphous volumes within the dog-bone shaped line cell, 
 slightly different numbers and amplitudes of the applied initial reset pulse(s), which might 
have amorphized the cell either with a single pulse or with multiple pulses in a more gradual 
manner [100], 
 variations in reported Ethreshold (t0) itself (35 ± 5 V/µm [122]), 
 random arrangement of any voids created after every reset operation (Figure 4-6b) [90], 
and 
 variable amorphous resistance drift [58] of different cells during the elapsed times between 
amorphization and threshold switching. 
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Assuming an ideal uniform cross-section of the amorphous regions, covering the entire 
cross-section area 𝐴௔௠௢௥௣௛௢௨௦ = 𝑊ீௌ் × 𝑡ீௌ் (WGST ~130 nm, tGST ~50 nm), the amorphous 
resistivity at ~10 s after amorphization, ρamorphous (10 s), can be calculated using the extracted 
Lamorphized and the drifted Rprogrammed (10 s): 
 
𝜌௔௠௢௥௣௛௢௨௦(10 𝑠) =
𝑊 × 𝑡
൬
𝐿௔௠௢௥௣௛௜௭௘ௗ
𝑅௣௥௢௚௥௔௠௠௘ௗ (10 𝑠)
൰
=
130 × 10ିଽ 𝑚 × 50 × 10ିଽ 𝑚
(6.13 ± 0.21) × 10ିଵହ 𝑚/Ω
= 106.04 ± 3.58 Ω. 𝑐𝑚 
(4-6) 
The calculated ρamorphous (10 s) is plotted as a function of the Rprogrammed at 10 s Figure 4-7d. 
The calculated ρamorphous (10 s) is ~ 106 Ω.cm, consistent with earlier reported value of ~148 Ω.cm 
at ~60 s after amorphization obtained from line cells [67]. It is important to note that the ρamorphous 
(10 s) calculation uses the extracted Lamorphized vs. measured Rprogrammed at 10 s values, measured 
under low-field (-0.1 to +0.1 V DC sweep) after the post-reset pulse was applied, hence ρamorphous 
is a low-field resistivity calculation. 
4.6 SPICE Simulations 
Our experimental setup includes parasitic capacitances which significantly contribute to the 
observed transients and phase change dynamics. This section discusses these contributions using 
SPICE simulations of the approximate circuit model. 
Figure 4-8a illustrates the approximate circuit model of the experimental setup shown in 
Figure 4-2b with the following components: 
1. Channel 1 termination resistance, Rch1 = 50 Ω. 
2. Capacitance of coaxial cable to channel 1 termination, Cch1 = 110 pF. 
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3. Cell resistance, Rcell: values used for SPICE simulations are listed in Table 4-2. 
4. Capacitance of probe arm to load resistor, Cload = 20 pF. 
5. Load resistance, Rload = 5.1 kΩ. 
6. Channel 3 and 4 termination resistance in parallel, Rch3,4 = 50 || 50 Ω = 25 Ω. 
7. Capacitance of coaxial cable to combined channel 3 and 4 terminations, Cch3,4 = 110 pF. 
 
Figure 4-8: (a) Approximate circuit model of experimental setup with measured parasitic 
capacitance and resistance values. (b) Simplified circuit model simulated in SPICE with the 
measured Vch1 and Vch3,4 waveforms. (c) Modeling of GST resistance switching with three switches 
in SPICE. 
To simulate the experimental non-ideal conditions, the measured voltage waveforms are 
inputted for channel 1 (Vch1) and channel 3 and 4 (Vch3,4) of Figure 4-4b as voltage sources in the 
SPICE model. Figure 4-8b shows the simplified circuit model, in which the parasitic capacitances 
and termination resistances for both channel 1 and channel 3,4 are already taken into account with 
116 
 
the measured Vch1 and Vch3,4. Rcell is switched between the measured amorphous resistance before 
pulse Ramorphous(before-pulse), a molten resistance Rmolten of 140 Ω, and the measured amorphous 
resistance after pulse Ramorphous(after-pulse) (Figure 4-8c) for the two re-amorphization events shown 
in Figure 4-4b. The Rmolten value is assumed to be 140 Ω for all simulations, which is slightly less 
than the hcp Rcrystalline, since melting incorporates a drop in the GST resistivity (as shown in Figure 
4-9 inset) [94]. Table 4-2 lists these different resistance values used for the circuit simulations. 
Table 4-2: Cell resistance Rcell used in simulations. 
Rcell Ramorphous(before-pulse) (MΩ) Rmolten (Ω) Ramorphous(after-pulse) (MΩ) 
1st Re-amorphization  
(at 1.9 V) 
10.55 140 48.05 
2nd Re-amorphization  
(at 8.2 V) 
82.66 140 392656.81 
Melting and re-amorphization of GST cell is simulated with three switches S1, S2, and S3 
that sequentially turn on and off to include the appropriate Rcell (Figure 4-8c). For both re-
amorphization cases, the melting is assumed to take place when Vch3,4 starts to rise and the re-
amorphization is assumed to take place right after the peak of Vch3,4. Table 4-3 lists the melting 
and re-amorphization instances for the two re-amorphization events used in simulations. At the 
starting of the simulation, S1 is closed while S2 and S3 are kept open to use Ramorphous(before-pulse) as 
the starting Rcell. During melting, Rcell is switched from Ramorphous(before-pulse) to Rmolten by opening S1 
and closing S2, with S3 open. For re-amorphization, Rcell is switched from Rmolten to Ramorphous(after-
pulse) by opening S2 and closing S3, with S1 open. 
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Figure 4-9: GST resistivity change as a function of temperature, measured data on 100 nm GST 
thin film (re-plotted from reference [94]). Inset shows an expanded view of the resistivity drop 
during melting. 
Table 4-3: Melting and re-amorphization instances for the two re-amorphization events used in 
simulations. 
 Melting instance (ns) Re-amorphization instance (ns) 
1st Re-amorphization (at 1.9 V) 214 228 
2nd Re-amorphization (at 8.2 V) 224 226 
The measured waveforms shown in Figure 4-4b only show Vch1 and the current through the 
channel 3,4 termination, ௏೎೓ర
ଶହ Ω
. To understand the phase change dynamics in the GST cell due to 
transient behaviors, it is necessary to compute the resulting cell voltage and current, Vcell and Icell, 
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respectively. Therefore, the voltage at the two ends of the cell Vch1 and Vinternal, Vch3,4, Vcell, and Icell 
are monitored in the simulations. 
To compare the magnitudes of the voltage and current values for the 1st and 2nd re-
amorphization events, the ratio ଶ
೙೏ ௥௘ି௔௠௢௥௣௛௜௭௔௧௜௢௡
ଵೞ೟  ௥௘ି௔௠௢௥௣௛௜௭௔௧௜
 is calculated for each. Table 4-4 lists the peak 
amplitudes for Vch1, Vch3,4, Vcell, and Icell and the ratios of these voltage and current values during 
the two re-amorphization events. This ratio is 4.59 for Vch1 but 0.32 for Vch3,4 (Table 4-4 and Figure 
4-10b). Similar ratios of 5.77 and 5.64 were obtained for Vcell and Icell, respectively (Figure 
4-10c,d), which is similar to the ratio calculated for Vch1. 
Table 4-4: Peak amplitudes for Vch1, Vch3,4, Vcell, and Icell and the ratios of these voltage and current 
values during the two re-amorphization events. 
 
Vch1 peak 
(V) 
Vch3,4 peak 
(mV) 
Vcell peak 
(V) 
Icell peak (mA) 
1st re-amorphization 1.98 11.20 1.51 10.77 
2nd re-amorphization 9.08 3.55 8.72 60.76 
2௡ௗ  𝑟𝑒 − 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
1௦௧  𝑟𝑒 − 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 4.59 0.32 5.77 5.64 
For both re-amorphization events, the Vcell ≈ Vch1 at the beginning, when Rcell ≈ 
Ramorphous(before-pulse), since Ramorphous(before-pulse) >> Rload and most of the applied Vch1 voltage is 
dropped across the cell. When melting occurs, the Vcell decreases and Icell increases sharply, since 
Rmolten << Rload. When quenching occurs, Vcell increases slowly again, since Ramorphous(after-pulse) >> 
Rload and Icell decreases sharply (Figure 4-10c,d) due to amorphization.  
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Figure 4-11 shows the details of the pulse transition edges of Figure 4-10 (highlighted in 
green and pink boxes in Figure 4-10). Icell for each of the re-amorphization events consists of a 
very sharp triangular current pulse (of ~15 ns duration and ~7.5 mA amplitude for the 1st re-
amorphization and ~3 ns duration and ~60 mA amplitude for the 2nd event), which occurs during 
the rising edge of the Vch1 (Figure 4-11). The very sharp rising edges of Icell for the two re-
amorphization events can be attributed to the additional capacitive current contributions due to the 
parasitic capacitances present in the system and to the thermal runaway of amorphous GST, which 
also lead to a quick rise of the cell temperature and produce enough Joule heating to induce 
melting. The sharp falling edges of Icell for the two re-amorphization events can initiate quenching 
and block the conduction path after amorphization. As a result, Vch3,4 consistently showed a slow 
decay due to the discharge of the parasitic capacitances of the setup.  
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Figure 4-10: Simulated cell voltage and current during 1st (solid blue line) and 2nd (dotted black 
line) re-amorphization events. 
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Figure 4-11: Expanded view of the rise and fall transitions of the applied voltage Vch1 (the 
highlighted regions of Figure 4-10). Simulated cell voltage and current during 1st (solid blue line) 
and 2nd (dotted black line) re-amorphization events. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
We propose a method to extract amorphized length in phase-change memory devices based on 
electrical measurements and use it to study the variability in amorphized lengths in 25 amorphized 
GST line cells of identical dimensions. Each cell is initially programmed to a similar amorphous 
resistance level (~ 8-65 MΩ) and then tested with a sequence of post-reset pulses of gradually 
increasing amplitude, separated by low-amplitude read DC sweeps. When the post-reset pulse 
amplitude is sufficient, a given cell undergoes threshold switching, melting and quenching and is 
re-amorphized. The process is continued until the cell breaks to observe as many re-amorphization 
events as possible. Each re-amorphization event is observed as a sudden increase in current during 
the pulse and a higher resistance after pulse, corresponding to a larger effective amorphized 
volume. The sharp increase in cell current is due to the parasitic capacitive current and thermal 
runaway in amorphous GST. The re-amorphization to increasingly higher resistance levels is also 
due to the sharp capacitive discharge current at the end of the post-reset pulse. Using the measured 
threshold voltage, and assuming an effective drifted threshold field at that switching time, the 
length of the amorphized region that experienced threshold switching was extracted, for each re-
amorphization event, and it was related with its previous resistance level. 
 This technique allows extraction of amorphized length from electrical characterization 
alone, which is important for device operation and failure analysis. A generally linear relation is 
observed, but with a significant spread, between the amorphized length and the programmed 
resistance. The amorphous resistivity calculated using the extracted amorphized length and the 
drifted programmed resistance, assuming the cross-section of the amorphous regions is uniform 
and equal to the cell cross-section, is ~106 Ω.cm, within the range of previously reported values 
for melt-quenched GST. 
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 The variability in the calculated amorphized lengths, based on the measured threshold 
voltages, can be attributed to different physical mechanisms such as the variable amorphous 
resistance drift and cycling history, the unique amorphous volumes formed, and different 
crystalline and amorphous initial conditions. SEM images of physically broken cells captured after 
the electrical measurements show the randomness in distribution of voids formed during recurrent 
reset operations, one of the expected factors in the observed variability. Combining these different 
physical sources of intrinsic variability in cell-to-cell and cycle-to-cycle operations, PCM devices 
offer a promising platform for hardware security primitives. 
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Chapter 5 | Resistance Drift in PCM and its 
Applications in Hardware Security 
5.1 Abstract 
Resistance drift and crystallization are critical concerns for accurate distinction between different 
states and for data retention in phase change memory (PCM), but their underlying physical 
mechanisms are still not fully understood. In this chapter, the resistance drift and crystallization of 
suspended and on-oxide amorphous Ge2Sb2Te5 PCM line cells are compared. 15 cells of each type 
are programmed at room temperature to a resistance level of ~10 MΩ and their resistances are 
monitored over ~3 months. The initial upward resistance drift trends are very similar for both cell 
types, but the later behaviour is noticeably different. The suspended cells exhibit increased 
variability in the upward drift after ~103 s, and at ~35-80 days some cells experience an abrupt 
crystallization, some show a saturation in the upward resistance drift, and others continue the 
upward resistance drift with fluctuations, possibly due to the imminent saturation. The on-oxide 
cells, on the other hand, demonstrate very consistent upward resistance drift during the entire 
measurement period. Temperature-accelerated measurements at 400 K on both type of cells also 
show the early and abrupt data loss in suspended cells. The abrupt crystallization in suspended 
PCM cells can potentially be useful for self-destructive hardware security primitives based on the 
loss of the stored data after a certain time. 
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5.2 Introduction 
Phase change memory (PCM) is an emerging non-volatile memory technology with high speed, 
high endurance, and good cell scalability. PCM relies on the reversible phase change of a 
chalcogenide material, typically Ge2Sb2Te5 (GST), between the high and low electrical resistance 
states (amorphous and crystalline phases) [47]. The amorphous phase in GST experiences a 
significant spontaneous upward resistance drift following a power law [58] before the subsequent 
decrease of resistance as the material transitions into crystalline face cantered cubic (fcc) and then 
into the stable hexagonal close packed (hcp) phase [65]. Resistance drift and crystallization pose 
device reliability concerns in distinction among states in multi-level cell operation and in data 
retention. The anomalous upward amorphous resistance drift in PCM has been linked with the 
structural relaxation of defects formed during the melt-quenching process in amorphization [121], 
while the expected crystallization is due to the nucleation and growth of seed crystallites in the 
amorphous volume. These spontaneous processes have been reported to depend on temperature 
[65], [72], read current [76], and the programmed resistance levels [58]. A study of resistance drift 
in unstressed and externally stressed GST films and in PCM cells with compressive or tensile stress 
induced by adjacent stressor layers showed that mechanical stress does not play an important role 
in the upward resistance drift of GST [126]. 
In this chapter, observations of long-term resistance evolutions in suspended and on-oxide 
(on-SiO2) GST line cells are reported, where the mechanical stress experienced by the two cell 
types is expected to be significantly different (Figure 5-1a-d). The measured cells are of very 
similar dimensions and the measurements are performed at room temperature and at 400 K. The 
electrical characterization results show shorter data retention time for the suspended cells as 
compared to that for the on-oxide cells. Even though this early data loss trend is detrimental for 
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long-term memory applications, it can be promising for hardware security applications. PCM cells 
have been studied before as candidate devices for hardware security as physical unclonable 
functions [32] or true random number generator [81] exploiting the inherent stochastic 
programming capability [88]. Here, a possible application of suspended PCM cells is presented 
for time-sensitive hardware security devices utilizing the spontaneous resistance drift and early 
crystallization. 
 
Figure 5-1: Suspended and on-oxide cells: (a,b) schematics of cell layout [67], (c,d) scanning 
electron microscopy (SEM) images. (e) Electrical measurement setup. 
5.3 Methods 
The measured suspended and on-oxide GST line cells were of 320-340 nm in length, 260-280 nm 
in width, and 50 nm in thickness. The cells were capped by Si3N4 and had bottom metal contact 
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pads (CVD grown TiN + PVD grown TiN for the suspended cells and CVD grown W contacts 
with Ti/TiN liner for the on-oxide cells) (Figure 5-1a-d). For the suspended cells, the underlying 
silicon dioxide was etched by diluted Hydrofluoric Acid (10:1), and then the cell was coated with 
Si3N4. The as-fabricated cells were annealed to 675 K for 10 minutes to stable hcp phase and then 
were programmed to an amorphous resistance level (Rprogrammed) of ~107 Ω at room temperature 
and ~106 Ω at 400 K. Because of the cell-to-cell process variations and the inherent programming 
variability present in PCM cells, one or multiple pulses of 200 ns durations with variable 
amplitudes (between 1.8 and 2.8 V) were applied on both types of cell to achieve a narrow 
distribution of Rprogrammed to exclude the contribution of different Rprogrammed levels on the drift 
properties. For both the room temperature and high temperature cases, the resistance of the 
programmed cells was monitored from ~10 s after the end of the amorphization pulse. For the 
room temperature measurement, the resistance was monitored at ~10 s intervals for ~5 minutes 
and then at different intervals (4-5 times) up to ~3 months or ~8×106 s. For the 400 K measurement, 
the resistance was monitored every ~10 s for a few days (~2-8 × 105 s) until complete 
crystallization was attained. 
The electrical measurement setup included an arbitrary function generating unit to generate 
the programming pulses, an oscilloscope to measure the input and output voltages, and a parameter 
analyzer to measure the cell resistance at any resistance level with a low-voltage DC sweep of -
0.1 to +0.1 V (Figure 5-1e). A relay was used to automatically switch between the pulsing and 
reading tasks. A load resistance of 5 kΩ was used to limit the current through the cell (Figure 
5-1e). 
128 
 
5.4 Results 
The room temperature long-term resistance evolutions for suspended and on-oxide cells were 
distinctly different. The suspended cells showed increased variability after ~103 s, and after ~35-
80 days a random behaviour was observed among the 15 cells with abrupt drop of resistance (for 
3 cells), decreasing resistance (for 3 cells), saturating upward resistance drift (for 1 cell), and 
fluctuating upward resistance drift (for the remaining 8 cells) (Figure 5-2a). The 15 on-oxide cells, 
on the other hand, maintained steady upward resistance drift with minimal fluctuation and no 
saturation or early crystallization at room temperature (Figure 5-2b). The larger fluctuation in the 
upward resistance drift trend of the suspended cells is possibly due to the imminence of saturation 
in the upward resistance drift trend. 
The upward resistance drift is generally described with the following power law, 
 
𝑅 = 𝑅଴𝑙𝑛 ൬
𝑡
𝑡଴
൰
ఔ
 (1) 
where R and R0 are the resistances measured at times t and t0 respectively and ν is the drift 
coefficient. Although the long-term resistance evolutions for two types of cell differ significantly, 
the initial upward resistance drift for both the suspended and on-oxide cells followed 
approximately the same trend with a drift coefficient of ~0.103±0.07 for the suspended cells and 
~0.103±0.05 for the on-oxide cells (Figure 5-2a-c), similar to the previously reported value of 
0.09-0.11 [58]. This confirms the previous findings of stress not playing a significant role on the 
upward resistance drift of GST [126]. With time, the inconsistent resistance drift of the suspended 
cells as compared to that of the on-oxide cells becomes more evident (Figure 5-2d). Whereas 
majority of the on-oxide cells showed a steady upward resistance drift with a resulting resistance 
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at ~3 months (R3months) ~4 times greater than the Rprogrammed [64], [101], many suspended cells 
behaved unpredictably - some drifting upwards (blue dashed box in Figure 5-2d), some 
crystallizing (maroon solid-lined ellipse in Figure 5-2d), and some undergoing abrupt resistance 
drops (green dash-dotted box in Figure 5-2d). Due to the slightly different Rprogrammed values, 
different suspended cells started crystallizing at slightly different elapsed times. 
 
Figure 5-2: Measured resistance of (a) 15 suspended and (b) 15 on-oxide amorphous cells as a 
function of time. Different colours represent different suspended and on-oxide cells. Insets of (a) 
and (b) are the vertically zoomed-in versions that clearly show the trends after ~103 s. (c,d) 
Resistance drift and crystallization in suspended (red star) and on-oxide (black sphere) cells as 
function of Rprogrammed: (c) initial upward resistance drift coefficient; (d) ratio of the R3months to the 
Rprogrammed. The green dash-dotted box shows the cells that already crystallized. The suspended 
cells that already crystallized, the ones that are still undergoing upward resistance drift, and the 
ones that are crystallizing are shown inside the green dash-dotted box, the blue dashed box, and 
the maroon solid-lined ellipse in (d), respectively. 
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  The temperature-accelerated measurements at 400 K also showed the sudden drop in 
resistance in the suspended cells, and a slower and more gradual crystallization in the on-oxide 
cells (Figure 5-3), where the latter was not observed with the measurements performed at room 
temperature. The suspended cells are expected to be mechanically relaxed compared to their on-
oxide counterparts and this may accelerate the spontaneous crystallization process leading to the 
comparatively shorter upward drift followed by the faster and more abrupt decrease in resistance. 
 
Figure 5-3: Resistance evolution in suspended (red stars) and on-oxide (black spheres) line cells 
at 400 K. 
5.5 Applications 
Suspended PCM line cells can be used for time-sensitive hardware security devices to prevent 
leakage of any sensitive data through physical attacks. These cells can be effectively used to store 
secured data for a certain period after which the data will be self-destructed and inaccessible in an 
irreversible way. However, as temperature accelerates the crystallization process, this method is 
particularly sensitive to the ambient temperature. The inherent stochasticity involved in the data 
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retention time of phase change materials could be further improved for security applications with 
advances in materials engineering. 
Another potential application of the resistance drift behaviour of PCM cells would be 
counterfeit IC detection. Since the drift behaviour is spontaneous and independent of usage, PCM 
cells could be used as passive time sensors to monitor how long an IC has been in the field and 
thus, detect recycled or remarked ICs. Further, the accelerated drift and sudden drop in resistance 
of the cells with increasing temperature could also be used for quickly detecting whether a chip 
has been exposed to high temperatures, a scenario common during the IC recycling process. 
Similarly, the freshness of perishable food products and medications, that are expected to remain 
within precise temperature ranges in the supply chain, can be detected by monitoring the resistance 
drift trend of an added PCM-based time sensor. Other potential uses of resistance drift behaviour 
would be in hardware security primitives such as non-volatile monotonic counters, which are used 
for preventing replay attacks, and drifting keys i.e., keys that gradually rotate to prevent cloning 
attacks. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Resistance evolutions in suspended and on-oxide phase change memory line cells of similar 
dimensions are examined at room temperature (15 cells of each type) and at 400 K (2 cells of each 
type). The suspended and on-oxide cells programmed to similar resistance levels showed identical 
initial upward resistance drift trend at room temperature, following the known power law with the 
same reported drift coefficient (~0.1), but distinct patterns afterwards. The suspended cells show 
a shorter upward drift period followed by increased variability and a much faster and drastic drop 
in resistance into the crystalline states, possibly due to reduced or significantly different type of 
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mechanical stress. Whereas the suspended cells are mechanically more relaxed and may sag in the 
air in between the two contacts, the on-oxide cells are expected to experience greater mechanical 
stress but also greater stability. The earlier and faster crystallization for suspended cells would 
hinder memory applications due to undesired data loss but could be useful for hardware security 
to store confidential and time-sensitive information for a limited, potentially pre-determined time. 
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Chapter 6 | Tamper Evidence of SEM Imaging Attack 
in PCM Cells 
6.1 Abstract 
Breach of security due to unauthorized access to electronic hardware devices or chips has recently 
become a serious concern for the internet-connected daily activities. Imaging with electron 
microscopy is one of the invasive techniques used to gain knowledge about a chip layout and 
extract secret information by the attackers. Automatic destruction or disturbance of the secret key 
during such invasive attacks are required to ensure protection against these attacks. In this chapter, 
the disturbance caused to programmed phase change memory (PCM) cells by the imaging electron 
beam during scanning electron microscopy (SEM) is experimentally characterized in terms of the 
measured cell resistance. A sudden increase of resistance is observed on all imaged amorphous 
cells while the cells programmed to intermediate states show either abrupt increase or erratic 
decrease. These erratic disturbances of state are promising to mislead an attacker that is trying to 
acquire a stored key and leave indelible marks of tampering. Since PCM is recently being 
considered for implementation of various hardware security primitives, these beam-induced state 
change and tamper-evidence features enhance security of PCM devices against physical attacks. 
6.2 Introduction 
Hardware security has recently become one of the important concerns for designing nano-scale 
devices that are used for numerous activities based on extensive data exchange in the current age 
of ‘internet of things’. Sensitive and private information exchanged during these communications 
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can be leaked not only by cyber infringements but also by attacks on these hardware devices [6]. 
These attacks can be of two categories: invasive and non-invasive. Theft of service, critical 
information, and intellectual property can take place when an adversary gains full control over the 
hardware device and has access to advanced facilities to perform invasive or physical attacks, such 
as micro-probing, reverse engineering, or imaging of the entire chip [127]. If the data stored in the 
attacked device can be erased or modified during the invasive attack process itself, leakage of 
sensitive information can be prevented. 
Imaging a chip with scanning electron microscopy (SEM) is one of the physical forms of 
hardware attacks [127]. However, imaging nano-scale devices with electron microscopy can often 
be challenging. The amount of energy applied in such small volumes can disturb the material 
properties, which becomes a serious concern for reliable operation in devices that are expected to 
store a certain data for a long period. For phase change memory (PCM), one of the emerging non-
volatile memory (NVM) technologies based on resistive switching mechanism [128], which is 
recently being considered for hardware security primitive implementations as well [100], these 
changes in material properties often changes the states. References [109], [110], [129] show 
evidences of beam-induced undesired crystallization during in-situ transmission electron 
microscopy (TEM) imaging of an as-deposited amorphous thin film of Ge2Sb2Te5 (GST), the most 
widely used phase change material. 
For SEM imaging, a focused electron beam hits the surface of a material. In the commonly 
used secondary electron (SE) mode of SEM imaging, the atoms present within ~100 nm of the 
surface go to higher energy states after being excited by the incident high-energy electron beam. 
The secondary electrons emitted by these excited atoms are collected for imaging. Even the 
minimal interaction between the electron beam and the surface material in this procedure can cause 
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significant disturbance of the existing phase in PCM, which is not only useful for prevention of 
data leakage but also provides the tamper-evidence property, which means revealing an attempt of 
a physical attack, such as SEM imaging of a chip, by an unauthorized entity. 
A PCM cell consists of a phase change material between two electrodes. This material can 
remain either at a high resistance state (HRS or amorphous) or at a low resistance state (LRS or 
crystalline). The phase change can be performed with an appropriate electrical or optical pulse. To 
electrically change the phase from LRS to HRS, i.e. for reset or amorphization process, a 
significantly high amplitude short electric pulse is applied so that a portion of the phase change 
material in the cell melts. A fast fall time of the applied reset pulse is chosen to quench the material 
quickly in order to form a disordered HRS state. On the other hand, for the phase change from 
HRS to LRS, i.e. set or crystallization process, a longer electric pulse with moderate amplitude is 
chosen so that the material temperature exceeds the crystallization temperature but stays below the 
melting temperature. The longer duration of the set pulse ensures the misplaced atoms of the 
amorphous state to return to their correctly ordered positions and thereby the LRS state is obtained 
[47]. The large memory window between the LRS and HRS enables multi-level cell (MLC) 
programming with several additional intermediate or mixed states, which increases capacity 
without increasing area in the chip [55]. Hence, any significant disturbance caused by imaging can 
mix densely-spaced states in MLC-based PCM. 
As described in section 1.3.2.2 of Chapter 1 and in Chapter 5, the amorphous phase in PCM 
undergoes a spontaneous increase of resistance followed by a decrease of resistance. The increase 
of resistance is called the upward resistance drift, which follows a power law behavior. The slope 
of the bi-logarithmic resistance vs. time plot is termed as drift exponent or drift coefficient [121]. 
Upward resistance drift occurs at room temperature and is accelerated at higher temperature [65]. 
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After the amorphous resistance reaches a maximum, a decrease of resistance takes place due to 
crystallization. Even though these spontaneous resistance evolutions in PCM follows slightly 
random trajectory on different cells or in different operation cycles of the same cell, these known 
general trends can be used to characterize the extent of disturbance caused during an imaging 
episode. 
In this chapter, the extent of phase change induced by SEM imaging in GST line cells is 
studied in terms of the measured resistance values before and after imaging. Prior to imaging, GST 
cells are programmed to different resistance levels, and the spontaneous resistance evolutions are 
monitored for each programmed cell. For different programmed resistance levels, some cells are 
imaged, and the others are left unimaged. We continue monitoring the resistance evolutions for 
both the imaged and unimaged cells and compare how much change is introduced in the resistance 
evolution of the imaged cells in contrast with the unaffected resistance evolution of the unimaged 
cells. Figure 6-1a shows the workflow of measurements performed on the imaged cells in this 
chapter. 
6.3 Methods 
The GST line cells used for this study are 50 nm thick with bottom metal contact pads. These cells 
are deposited on oxidized silicon substrates and capped with Si3N4. All cells are of dog-bone shape 
with ~100 nm width in the middle and ~420±20 nm length between the metal contacts (further 
details on fabrication can be found in [65], [67]). Figure 6-1b shows an SEM image of an example 
cell. Prior to programming the cells, all cells were initialized to the LRS by annealing at 675 K for 
10 minutes. The resulting hexagonal close packed (hcp) states are then electrically characterized 
at a room temperature probe station. 
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Low voltage read operations with DC sweeps from -0.1 to +0.1 V were performed to read 
the cell resistance at any stage of this study. A parameter analyzer was used to perform the DC 
sweep read operations. A load resistance of ~1 kΩ was connected in series with the measured cell 
to limit the current flowing through the cell during programming. To amorphize the cells, a 
rectangular voltage pulse of 200 ns duration and 30 ns rise and fall time was applied. By applying 
a single reset pulse with amplitudes varying between 2.4-3 V on different cells, amorphous 
resistance values between ~20-70 MΩ were achieved. Due to programming variability, there were 
slight variations in the programmed resistance values on different cells, even when the same reset 
pulse amplitude was applied [100]. 
 
Figure 6-1: (a) Workflow of measurements. (b) SEM image of an example dog-bone GST line 
cell. (c) Electrical characterization setup. 
To program the cells to the intermediate states, similar pulse amplitude, duration, and rise 
time were chosen; only the fall time of the applied voltage pulse was elongated to 200 ns to allow 
slow crystallization inside the formed amorphous volume [63]. An arbitrary waveform generator 
was used to generate the applied voltage pulses and an oscilloscope was used to measure the 
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required output voltages. A relay circuit was used to automatically switch between read and pulse 
operations without lifting probes in the middle of the measurements. Figure 6-1c shows the 
experimental setup schematic. The resistance of each programmed cell was measured at ~10 
seconds after applying the programming pulse, then initially at every ~9 s for a few minutes, and 
afterwards at different times up to ~2×106 s (~23 days). 
For all SEM imaging, moderate energy inputs of 5 kV and 0.4 nA were chosen. A working 
distance of ~2 mm, magnification of ~200,000x (in full window view), SE mode, and a ‘through 
the lens detector (TLD)’ were selected. 4 scans of 10 µs dwell time were used for imaging each 
cell. 
6.4 Results 
First, the resistance evolutions for the unimaged cells at various programmed resistance levels 
were monitored. Figure 6-2a shows the expected upward resistance drift trend of an unimaged 
amorphous cell. The resistance drift coefficient (ν) was measured for three different elapsed time 
segments and Figure 6-2a shows that ν gradually increases over time. 
Figure 6-2b,c show the resistance drift trends from two intermediate resistance levels. It is 
well known that ν for the initial upward resistance drift in cells programmed at the intermediate 
states is much lower than that for fully amorphous cells [130]. Here, it is also observed that for 
some cells programmed at the intermediate states, a maximum resistance is reached at the end of 
the upward resistance drift, and then the decreasing resistance trend takes place, i.e. crystallization 
begins (Figure 6-2b). Crystallization initiates at a much shorter elapsed time in the intermediate 
states, which is below 106 s in Figure 6-2b, as compared to that in the fully amorphous states 
(~2×107 s or ~7.5 months as reported in [65]). 
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Figure 6-2: Spontaneous resistance evolution monitored for ~2×106 s (~23 days) since 
programming for (a) an amorphous cell and (b,c) two cells programmed at intermediate states. The 
upward resistance drift coefficient values (ν) were calculated at three segments of the measurement 
period. 
Some other cells programmed at the intermediate states, however, continue the upward 
resistance drift through the end of the measurement (Figure 6-2c). Hence, it appears that the long-
term resistance evolution trend for the intermediate state cells is more variable than that for the 
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amorphous cells. The intermediate states are likely to form in very stochastic geometrical patterns 
on different cells. During the long fall time of the applied programming pulse, the nucleated 
crystalline islands in the amorphous volume can be formed at random locations. This random 
arrangement of these islands on different cells is likely to cause the saturation of upward resistance 
drift and initiation of crystallization process at different elapsed times. Moreover, an eventual 
faster data-loss is expected in these cells programmed at intermediate states despite any variability, 
as compared to those programmed to fully amorphous states [64], [101]. 
Figure 6-3 shows the upward resistance drift trends for 6 unimaged amorphous cells in 
gray dotted lines with open symbols and 8 imaged amorphous cells in solid colored lines with 
sphere symbols. Among these 8 imaged cells, 4 are imaged 1 day after programming (early-
imaging: Figure 6-3a) and the other 4 are imaged 11 days after programming (late-imaging: Figure 
6-3b). For the 4 early-imaged cells, a sudden increase of resistance was observed upon the imaging 
procedure, followed by a settling back to the usual drift trend, similar to the unimaged cells. The 
average drift coefficient calculated in between the last two measured data-points (νavg) for the 6 
unimaged cells was ~0.1353, and that for the 4 early-imaged cells (post-imaged) was practically 
the same, ~ 0.1345. 
On the other hand, for the 4 late-imaged cells, there was not only a sudden increase of 
resistance upon imaging but also an acceleration of the upward resistance drift in between the two 
measurements after imaging. The average drift coefficient measured with these two data points for 
these 4 late-imaged cells is much higher (νavg of ~0.781) as compared to that for their unimaged 
and early-imaged counterparts. These results indicate that the underlying physical mechanisms 
behind the upward resistance drift in the amorphous GST cells, which has been attributed to 
structural relaxation [121] and to charge trapping [131] processes, are affected by the high-energy 
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imaging electron beam and the result of this interaction depends on the elapsed time after 
amorphization at which beam exposure occurs (early vs. late-imaged cells). Understanding this 
effect, however, requires further experiments and studies including the accurate estimation of the 
cell temperature increase during the imaging procedure. 
 
Figure 6-3: Spontaneous resistance evolution of unimaged and imaged amorphous PCM cells: 6 
un-imaged cells (in gray dotted lines with open symbols) and 8 imaged cells (in solid colored lines 
with sphere symbols). Among the 8 imaged cells: (a) 4 were imaged early (1 day after 
programming) and (b) 4 were imaged late (11 days after programming). Insets show the magnified 
views of R-t areas marked with the dashed rectangular boxes, where SEM imaging was performed. 
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For the cells programmed at intermediate states, in which the resistance evolution trends 
of the unimaged cells vary, these beam-induced disturbances of resistance are more significant and 
lead to either increase or decrease in resistance on different cells. Figure 6-4 shows 7 unimaged 
cells programmed at intermediate states (gray dotted lines with open symbols), with 4 of these 
cells showing only upward resistance drift and the other 3 cells showing upward then downward 
drift. Figure 6-4 also shows beam-induced erratic resistance evolutions of 3 imaged cells 
programmed at intermediate states, plotted as solid colored lines with sphere symbols. While some 
cells show increase in resistance, others show decrease. This indicates that the physical 
mechanisms responsible for both upward resistance drift and crystallization might get accelerated 
during imaging but with different magnitudes on different cells. Hence, some cells show a drop of 
resistance possibly due to accelerated crystallization, whereas the others show increase in 
resistance due to possible accelerated upward resistance drift during imaging. These speculations, 
again, need further studies and computational estimates of the cell temperature. 
The imaging beam-induced indelible changes in the resistance evolution clearly indicate 
disturbances in the existing material in the programmed PCM cells. On one hand, this marks 
challenges in imaging procedure, but on the other hand, it shows the promising tamper-evidence 
property and disturbance of secret data stored in GST cells [6]. Since the resistance of a 
programmed PCM cell is changed upon imaging, it thwarts the attacker by disturbing the 
information stored in the device during the physical attack and by revealing the invasion attempt 
to subsequent authorized users. Without imaging, it is difficult for an attacker to gain knowledge 
about the chip layout. Since SEM imaging itself does not reveal the state of the imaged cell 
(amorphous or crystalline) and further micro-probing attack is required to obtain the secret key, 
the change of states during SEM imaging can mislead the attacker and jumble the secret key. This 
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beam-induced disturbance of states and tamper-evidence properties can make PCM devices more 
secure against physical imaging attacks, compared to CMOS devices for example, using the 
inherent physical properties of GST, without requiring any additional security seal or mark. 
 
Figure 6-4: Spontaneous resistance evolutions of unimaged and imaged PCM cells programmed 
at intermediate states. The evolutions for the unimaged and imaged cells are plotted as ‘gray dotted 
lines with open symbols’ and as ‘solid colored lines with sphere symbols’ respectively. The 
instances of imaging of the 3 cells are as indicated. Two gray dotted lines showing upward 
resistance drift only (with triangle and hexagonal open symbols) are thickened to distinguish their 
trends from their peers with very similar trends (gray dotted lines with circle and pentagon open 
symbols). 
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6.5 Conclusion 
We have characterized the disturbance in the existing resistance state of a phase change memory 
nanodevice induced by the imaging electron beam of the scanning electron microscope. By 
monitoring the spontaneous resistance evolutions at different programmed resistance levels of the 
imaged and unimaged cells, the disturbances caused during imaging were identified. A sudden 
increase of the amorphous resistance was observed for the amorphous GST cells during imaging. 
For the cells programmed at the intermediate states, an unpredictable yet clear change was 
observed. 
Any disturbance of existing state in a memory device can be detrimental for reliable 
operation in densely-spaced multi-level cell programming schemes. The significant disturbances 
observed from the experimental results indicate the challenges associated with imaging of PCM 
nanodevices, which is, conversely, promising for the alteration of stored secret keys and for the 
tamper-evidence property of GST cells, making PCM more secure against invasive imaging 
attacks. 
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Chapter 7 | Optical Characterization of ZnO Nano-
forest for Hardware Security  
7.1 Abstract 
Disordered systems or materials with intrinsic variability in some measurable quantity are recently 
being considered for hardware security applications like physical unclonable functions or PUFs. 
An inexpensive optical PUF system based on a dense nanoforest of ZnO nanorods is presented 
here. A relatively concentrated seed solution used in the synthesis process results in these high 
density nanorods grown mostly in the upright direction with some vertical hollow spots in between 
neighboring nanorods. This nanorod arrangement grown on optically reflective substrates works 
as a nano-porous thin film and produces Fabry-Pérot fringes under perpendicularly incident 
focused white light. The local variations in density, height, diameter, orientation angle, and 
hexagonal perfection of the ZnO nanorods give rise to unique and reproducible scattering light 
spectra that vary significantly from one spot on the sample to another. Over 1500 optical 
measurements are performed to show the strongly variable optical characteristics. These distinct 
spectra show promise as the raw responses for ZnO-based optical PUFs. 
7.2 Introduction 
As described in previous chapters, hardware security is a growing need in the current age of 
‘internet of things’. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) can provide security to essential 
hardware devices that remotely control sensitive applications and exchange private information by 
providing a unique identity to each device. PUFs are made of partly disordered physical systems 
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that cannot be cloned. The output or ‘response’ generated from a PUF depends on an externally 
applied input or ‘challenge’ and the unique and unclonable disorder present in the system. Various 
types of PUFs have been implemented using electrical, optical, and other types of systems with 
measurable stochastic quantities [6]. 
A token-based inexpensive optical PUF made of randomly placed glass spheres was 
reported by Pappu et al. and was the first demonstration of a PUF [9]. The disordered system 
contained randomly arranged sub-millimeter size light scattering glass spheres (~500 µm in 
diameter) inside a token and the challenge was the angle at which a laser light was shone. The light 
was scattered across the 3-dimensional token via a random path through the glass spheres, and the 
raw response was the speckle pattern generated on a screen, which was unique for each angle [9]. 
The large number of challenge response pairs (CRPs) made that design a strong PUF, but the 
sensitive optical system was reported to pose some challenges for reliable reproduction of the 
CRPs [10]. Moreover, the source of variability of this glass sphere-based optical PUF is the random 
mixing or placement of the individual glass spheres inside the token, which may be readable as 
indicated by a recent work by Malkiel et al. [132], where a deep learning approach was used to 
predict a nano-structure geometry from its far-field optical response. Once this arrangement is 
read, cloning can easily be performed. 
Hence, a disordered system, in which the variability is not only naturally occurring but also 
is irreproducible due to the inherent features present in processing or growth procedures can ensure 
better security with the essential unclonable feature of PUF. Exploiting the variable optical 
properties arising from the intrinsic randomness present at the micro- and nano-scales of different 
materials or structures can lead to new advances in the field of optical PUFs. Kursawe et al. 
demonstrated a reconfigurable optical PUF using a polymer layer containing randomly distributed 
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light scattering particles [34]. ZnO can also be a good choice of material to introduce randomness 
since it easily forms into intricate nanostructures using a variety of synthesis processes. ZnO is a 
direct bandgap semiconductor with useful optoelectronic and piezoelectric properties [133]. It is 
also an inexpensive material, found in abundance in nature, is environment-friendly, anti-bacterial, 
and bio-compatible. Among several morphologies of ZnO nanostructures, ZnO nanorods (NRs) 
have the hexagonal Wurtzite crystalline structure and can be grown with inexpensive solution-
based synthesis processes [133]. 
We have grown ZnO nanoforests with dense arrays of ZnO NRs using chemical bath 
deposition (CBD) technique, a low-cost solution-based synthesis process, on optically reflective, 
opaque, and transparent substrates. Optical characterization of the light scattered from the ZnO 
NRs was performed by shining focused white light at different spots on the samples. Due to the 
inherent spatial variations of the nucleated ZnO NRs and the random dimensions of individual 
NRs, highly stochastic scattered light spectra were observed from one spot to the other on the 
samples of dense small ZnO NRs grown on the reflective substrates. The applications of these 
stochastic optical properties for hardware security are discussed in this chapter. 
7.3 ZnO NRs Synthesis Process 
Before the growth process, all substrates were cleaned with deionized water, soap solution, and 
ethanol and dried with nitrogen. The CBD synthesis process was initiated with the seed solution 
preparation step (Figure 7-1a), with 0.0457 gm of zinc acetate dihydrate [Zn(Ch3Coo)2.2H2O] and 
50 ml of ethanol [C2H6O]. Next, the top surface of the clean and dry substrates was drop-coated 
with the prepared seed solution (Figure 7-1b). Then, the samples were heated on a hot plate at 350° 
C for 30 minutes (Figure 7-1c). Finally, a pre-cursor solution was prepared with 25 mM of zinc 
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nitrate hexahydrate [Zn(NO3)2.6H2O], 25 mM of hexamethylenetetramine [(CH₂)₆N₄] and 6 mM 
of polyethyleneimine [(C2H5N)n] in water; the samples were dipped into the pre-cursor solution at 
a ~45° angle and annealed at 90° C for 24 hours (Figure 7-1d). Further details on the CBD synthesis 
procedure can be found in Refs. [134]–[140]. 
 
Figure 7-1: Schematic of the ZnO nanoforest growth process steps – (a) preparation of seed 
solution, (b) drop coating of the seed solution on the substrates, (c) sintering at 350°C for 30 
minutes, and (d) annealing the samples in a precursor solution in an oven at 90°C for 24 hours 
[134]. 
Two sizes of NRs were grown: NRs with diameter ~200 nm were produced with a 
concentrated seed solution (with smaller molar concentration of water), (Figure 7-2e-h), whereas 
larger NRs, ~500 nm in diameter, were achieved with diluted seed solution (with larger molar 
concentration of water) (Figure 7-2i-l) [134], [140]. These small and large NRs were grown on 3 
types of substrates (Figure 7-2 shows the cross-section schematics of the substrates in the 1st row 
and the scanning electron microscope (SEM) images of all samples in the 2nd and 3rd rows): 
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Figure 7-2: 1st row: Cross-section schematics of the substrates used in this chapter: (a) ~550 nm 
thick SiO2 film on p−-sc-Si, (b) ~130 nm thick p++ poly-Si film deposited on top of ~550 nm thick 
SiO2 film and p−-sc-Si, (c) p−-sc-Si, and (d) FTO-coated glass substrate. 2nd and 3rd rows: False 
colored scanning electron microscope (SEM) images of ZnO NRs with average diameter of (e) 
~200 nm on SiO2, (f) ~200 nm on p++-poly-Si, (g) ~100 nm on p−-sc-Si, (h) ~100 nm on FTO 
glass, (i)~400 nm on SiO2, (j) ~600 nm on p++-poly-Si, (k) ~500 nm on p−-sc-Si, and (l) ~400 nm 
on FTO. 
i. optically reflective substrates –two substrates of this type were used: silicon dioxide (SiO2) 
and highly doped p-type poly-crystalline silicon (p++-poly-Si) on SiO2 – both deposited on 
low-doped p-type single crystal Si (Figure 7-2a,b,e,f,i,j), 
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ii. optically opaque substrate – lightly doped p-type single crystal silicon (p−-sc-Si) (Figure 
7-2c,g,k), 
iii. optically transparent substrate – fluorine doped tin oxide (FTO) coated glass (Figure 
7-2d,h,l). 
ZnO NRs with the characteristic wurtzite structure were observed on all samples. 
7.4 Optical Studies 
Focused white light was shone vertically on the ZnO nanoforest samples using an ECO light source 
150 (180 W) and an optical microscope. A portion of the scattered light from the ZnO NRs was 
captured by an optical fiber placed at ~45° angle. The optical fiber was attached to a mechanical 
micro-positioner and kept at a fixed location and orientation. The optical fiber was connected to a 
wide-band (200-1100 nm) optical spectrum analyzer (Ocean Optics HR2000+) to collect and 
analyze the scattered light (Figure 7-3). 
 
Figure 7-3: Schematic of the optical measurement setup on the ZnO nanoforest samples. 
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An integration time of 50 ms was used for the spectrometer and a 20x lens magnification 
was used for all measurements (Figure 7-3). The light source was moved over the nanoforest 
samples, and the light spectra scattered from different locations were recorded. Hence, the 
challenge of the proposed PUF is the 2-dimentional co-ordinate of the illuminated spot and the 
raw response is the scattered light spectrum. 
7.5 Results 
The scattered light spectra recorded from different spots on the ZnO NR samples grown on the 
optically opaque and transparent substrates only showed slight variations in intensity. The same 
was true for the large ZnO NRs grown on the optically reflective substrates. Figure 7-4 shows the 
similar scattered light spectra recorded at 10 different spots on the large ZnO NRs grown on the 
p++-poly-Si substrate and an example of the corresponding optical microscope image of this sample 
is shown in the inset. 
 
Figure 7-4: Scattered optical spectra recorded at 10 different spots on the ~600 nm ZnO NRs on 
p++-poly-Si sample. Spectrum analyzer integration time: 50 ms. Inset shows an example optical 
microscope image of the sample. Optical microscope lens magnification: 20x. 
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It was only the smaller ZnO NRs grown on the optically reflective substrates that showed 
very interesting variable spectra from different locations. Figure 7-5a shows the distinct scattered 
light spectra at 5 different spots on the small ZnO NRs grown on p++-poly-Si. The solid black line 
represents the low-intensity scattered spectrum from the bare p++-poly-Si substrate (without ZnO 
NR grown on top). Due to the very high optical reflectance of this substrate, almost all the incident 
focused light reflects vertically, and no light is detected at the optical fiber placed at ~45° angle. 
Figure 7-5b-g show the corresponding optical microscope images of the bare p++-poly-Si substrate 
and the 5 spots from the small ZnO NRs grown on p++-poly-Si. The microscope images of these 5 
spots (Figure 7-5c-g) look remarkably identical despite their significantly different scattered light 
spectra (Figure 7-5a) [141]. 
 
Figure 7-5: (a) Scattered optical spectra from the bare p++-poly-Si (low-intensity solid black line) 
and at 5 different locations of ~200 nm ZnO NRs on p++-poly-Si sample. (b-g) Corresponding 
optical microscope images. 
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Additional SEM imaging of the samples of small NRs on reflective substrates (Figure 
7-2e,f) was performed (Figure 7-6) to understand the possible physical mechanisms behind the 
large variations in the scattered optical spectra. It was observed that the NRs on these samples 
(Figure 7-2e,f) are denser than the other small NRs grown on the opaque and transparent substrates 
(Figure 7-2g,h). Perhaps more importantly, these NRs (Figure 7-2e,f) are aligned mostly in the 
vertical direction with very little or no inclination (Figure 7-6a-c), as compared to the larger NRs 
in Figure 7-2i-l, resulting in more of a nano-porous film with optical spectra similar to those 
observed in the nano-porous silicon and anodic aluminum oxide films [142], [143]. Figure 7-6b 
also shows rough top surface of the NRs that can lead to more randomly scattered light from these 
samples, and Figure 7-6d shows the irregularities in the ideal hexagonal crystalline perfection and 
the randomness corresponding to diameter and height. The light waves that directly reflect from 
the top surface of the ZnO NRs and the ones that refract through the ZnO NRs and are then 
reflected from the substrate interfere, leading to Fabry-Pérot fringes. When the light source is 
moved over different spots, the wavelengths at which constructive and destructive optical 
interference occur change significantly, due to the local random arrangements of NRs, resulting in 
distinct scattered fringes. 
For the samples grown on opaque substrate, the refracted light was absorbed in the 
substrate, and for the ones grown on the transparent substrate, refracted light was transmitted 
through the substrate. No Fabry-Pérot fringes were observed on the samples grown on these 
substrates. The larger nanorods on the reflective substrates, which did not form nano-porous-like 
thin films, did not produce Fabry-Pérot fringes either. 
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Figure 7-6: SEM images of ~200 nm ZnO NRs on p++-poly-Si at (a, b) 45° angle and (c) 90° angle 
(cross-section). (d) Top view SEM image. 
Figure 7-7 shows the scattered light spectra monitored at 652 locations on the small ZnO 
NRs grown on the p++-poly-Si substrate in (a) and at 838 locations on the small ZnO NRs grown 
on the SiO2 substrate in (b). The significant randomness observed in the scattered light spectra in 
Figure 7-7a,b is shown quantitively in terms of the index of dispersion, which refers to the ratio of 
the variance to the mean in Figure 7-7c. As values of index of dispersion greater than 1 indicates 
high variations, the very large values obtained for all wavelengths in Figure 7-7c indicate that these 
random scattered light spectra are promising candidates as the raw responses for optical PUF 
primitives. 
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Figure 7-7: Strong variability observed at the scattered light spectra monitored from (a) 652 
locations on the ~200 nm ZnO NRs on p++-poly-Si sample and (b) 838 locations on the ~200 nm 
ZnO NRs on SiO2 sample. (c) Index of dispersion (i.e. variance over mean) for the random spectra 
shown in (a) and (b). 
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7.6 Conclusion 
Random nanorod arrangements in dense ZnO nanoforest grown on optically reflective substrates 
with inexpensive solution-based synthesis techniques result in significant variability in scattered 
optical spectra when focused white light is vertically incident on different spots of the sample. The 
observed spectra resemble Fabry-Pérot interference fringes, likely due to the multiple reflections 
from ZnO nanorods and substrate surface. Even if a certain ZnO nanorod arrangement can be 
modeled in the future from the observed scattered optical spectra, the complex, random and, 3-
dimensional nano-scale arrangements cannot be reproduced because of the inherent randomness 
present in the solution-based synthesis technique. This unclonable property of the proposed ZnO 
nanoforest makes it more suitable for the PUF applications than the previously reported glass-
sphere-based optical system [9], [10]. 
Optical spectra were obtained from more than 1500 illuminated spots on two optically 
reflective substrates. Further quantization analysis, such as the Gabor transform used by Pappu et 
al. [9], is required to generate digital responses from these analog raw spectral responses. Further 
efforts to integrate entire optical systems on chip, such as the one proposed by Rührmair et al. with 
aligned light source and sensor arrays [10], can eventually make these PUFs practical. Although 
the proposed ZnO optical PUF is not reconfigurable, its low-cost, simple and environment-friendly 
production, and high variability and unclonability features, can render it useful in various hardware 
security scenarios.  
The variability observed in the scattered optical spectra from these small ZnO NRs on the 
reflective substrates cannot be modified or reconfigured later. Once these samples are grown, the 
random yet static secret keys are generated based on the uncontrolled solution-based synthesis 
157 
 
process. Hence, if all CRPs are rigorously measured by a physical attack attempt, the static secret 
key is lost. Despite the unclonable feature of the hardware security primitives based on such static 
sources of physical randomness, the security against physical attack is vulnerable due to the 
inability to reconfigure the CRPs further. In contrast, PUFs based on the programming variability 
of phase change memory and other non-volatile memory technologies ensure robust security 
against physical attacks for their reconfigurable properties. 
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Chapter 8 | Outlook 
Phase change memory (PCM) provides a new platform for hardware security primitives, such as 
physical unclonable functions (PUFs), true random number generators, and time-sensitive memory 
applications, enabled through several unique properties of PCM:  
- programming variability due to complex mechanisms behind amorphization and 
crystallization processes of phase-change materials that cannot be reproduced, predicted or 
modeled exactly;  
- high endurance devices that enable very large (practically unlimited) sets of refreshed, non-
volatile challenge-response pairs;  
- read disturb and thermal cross-talk effects that can potentially be used for tamper evidence 
schemes; 
- resistance drifts of the amorphous and crystalline fcc states that add to the intrinsic 
programming variability in following cycles.  
Although extensive research efforts have made PCM the well-established memory 
technology it is today, most have focused on improving memory performance, which includes 
minimizing variability, and only a few reports have discussed the intentional use of variability for 
hardware security. In this dissertation, electrical characterization of PCM line cells have been 
presented for feasible implementation of several hardware security primitives based on PCM 
devices. Figure 8-1 shows a summary of the contributions of this dissertation and outlook to extend 
each of these contributed areas.  
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Figure 8-1: Summary of the contributions of this dissertation and the outlook for further works. 
To advance the performance of PCM-based PUFs (discussed in Chapter 2 and 3), new cell 
design and material search can be the next steps. To understand the underlying physical 
mechanisms for the variations involved in the amorphized locations, shapes, and sizes (discussed 
in Chapter 4), in-situ transmission electron microscopy (TEM) can be done. In-situ TEM can also 
improve the current understanding of underlying physical mechanisms for spontaneous resistance 
evolution in PCM (discussed in Chapter 5) and the disturbances caused by imaging beam on this 
evolution (discussed in Chapter 6). Finally, further efforts in producing digital output bits from the 
raw analog responses of the ZnO-based PUF (discussed in Chapter 7) are required for security 
implementations.  
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